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I. INTRODUCTION 
Vietnam has been undergoing economic reform since 1986. An 
important part of that reform has been a re-examination of the role of the 
courts and the bureaucracy in the resolution of disputes. Vietnam's 
leadership has expressed the need to create rule by law in accordance with 
market principles as opposed to the rule of the bureaucracy that marked 
the centrally planned economies. The movement from the rule of the 
bureaucracy to rule by law is not necessarily a fast or an easy one. In the 
case of Vietnam, the ongoing tensions between the system that is hoped 
for and the system as it currently exists often create perverse or simply 
unexpected outcomes. 
On the one hand, domestic businessmen and parties to disputes 
seem to have been able to quickly understand the lay of the land in the 
gray area between rule by law and the rule of the bureaucracy. That 
understanding implies an ability to navigate the 'system' and an ability to 
navigate it with a certain degree of accuracy and reasonable expectation 
of achieving an outcome. This paper attempts to describe the gray area 
. and how parties are able to navigate the system in Vietnam. 
This paper begins with a brief overview of the formal legal 
system in Vietnam, focusing on three of the governmental structures 
central to the legal system: the Supreme People's Court, the State 
Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Justice.! The paper then reviews 
avenues of dispute resolution available to parties through the courts and 
the formal legal system, including an overview of the organization of the 
courts and the procuracy at the central government and provincial levels. 
The tensions within both vertical and horizontal orgauizations of these 
bureaucracies in the management of disputes are central themes that run 
throughout the discussion of dispute resolution and the functioning of the 
judicial system. 
Next, the paper describes three types of common disputes 
(commercial disputes, property disputes; and administrative suits) and 
analyzes how the administrative and bureaucratic contexts exert influence 
on how and why disputes in these areas are resolved the way they are. In 
particular, this section will focus on the important role of administrative 
discretion and the role of the government bureaucracy, as opposed to the 
judiciary, in the resolution of disputes. Another theme that is pervasive is 
the status of property rights and disputes over property rights. In 
The roles of the Ministry of Public Security and the Communist Party are quite 
considerable in the context of Vietnam's legal system. Because of lack of access to real 
infonnation about their activities, this paper deals with them in only the most minimal fashion. That 
is, of course, not to discount their true importance. 
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reviewing the available data and in discussions with court offidals, it 
becomes clear that a substantial number of disputes that are otherwise 
categorized, in fact, are property (real estate) related disputes. 
A. The Context of Economic Reform 
By almost any measure, the economic reform program undertaken 
in 1986 by Vietnam has been successful in ensuring rapid economic 
growth and a substantial reduction in poverty over the past fifteen years. 
Average economic growth over the 1990's was 8.5%. Exports to non-
CMEA (non-Comecon) countries prior to 1987 were negligible. By the 
mid-1990's exports to non-CMEA countries grew to more than $10 
billion per year. Throughout the 1980's, Vietnam was a net-importer of 
food. Following privatization of agricultural production in the early 
stages of reform, Vietnam became one of the three largest exporters of 
rice in the world, following Thailand and the United States. Between 
1986 and 1999, poverty rates fell from 70% to 30%.' While some of the 
growth may be attributable to the low starting point, the shift to market-
based provision of goods and services and the wholesale privatization of 
agriculture (80% of the population is rural) have created significant 
opportunities for peasants and enterprises to make independent decisions 
about sales, investment, saving and consumption, and these new 
opportunities have been directly responsible for much of the economic 
growth. 
When Vietnam embarked on its program of market-oriented 
economic reform, the shortcomings of its socialist legal system became 
painfully obvious to observers at every level. As the legal structures of 
central planning collided with market realities, the law began to look 
more and more irrelevant. On the ground, state agencies and individuals 
routinely ignored laws and legal structures that were at obvious odds with 
the realties of the market.' The glaring and growing discrepancy between 
the 'law on paper' and law in reality created an urgent need for the 
government to respond.' 
UNDP, Expanding Choices for the Rural Poor (Dec. 1998). at 
http://www.undp.org.vn/undpllih/puhs.htm. (last visited Sept 1, 2001). 
3 Nguyen Tri Dung, Reform of Government's Structure Essential to Country '8 Renovation, 
VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, Dec. 30, 1991, at 2. 
4 The earliest demands for changes to the legal system ironically came not from inside, but 
from the outside. The 1987 Foreign Investment Law was the first of many laws and ordinances put 
into place. The 1987 Foreign Investment Law, developed in response to international investor 
interest, was intended to create a regulatory framework to encourage and manage foreign 
investment in Vietnam. 
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In an effort to adapt to the rapid changes in the economy and 
society that accompanied economic reform, the government of Vietnam 
undertook an aggressive campaign of legislative writing; including 
amendments to the Constitution in 1992. The rush of legislative activity 
during the 1990's was marked, more than anything else, by a desire by 
the government and the legal establishment to catch up with the realities 
on the ground. These legislative efforts included nearly 120 new laws and 
ordinances between the years 1992 and 1999 and thousands of 
implementing regulations and guidelines. The legislation was directed at 
a number of issues facing the government, such as government 
organization, criminal law, civil law, an overhaul of the tax system, 
redefmition of land and property laws, foreign and domestic investment 
promotion, trade and commerce laws, banking, education, company law, 
and, finally, laws covering budget and government operations.' 
In this fIrst phase of legal reform, the focus has been on 
establishing a legal framework, creating a set of rules that can 
accommodate the market economy, and adjusting the structures of 
government to the realities of a market-based system. Initially, the 
process of legal reform gave scant attention to improving the operation or 
efficiency of the courts. Indeed, 1992 Constitution did little to change the 
existing structure of the courts from that which had existed in the 1980 
Constitution.' Over time, as economic actors and individuals have begun 
to seek access to the courts for the resolution of disputes, the scope and 
nature of court activities have also come under scrutiny.' 
Anyone who has ever visited Vietnam will recognize that 'law on 
paper' and law iniact can, at times, be far from the same. Where the 'law 
on paper' is often vague and contradictory, great discretion is left to local 
officials and petty bureaucrats. Also, where the administrative bodies are 
sometimes hostile to the ongoing changes, the subsequent implementing 
regulations can be written in such a way as to ensure defeat of the overall 
In the Vietnamese definition, 'laws' are passed by the National Assembly and bold 
priority over all other legal documents. Ordinances are issued by the Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly and have the effect of laws. Implementing guidelines and regulations are issued 
by the various ministries and hold a legal standing secondary to either laws or ordinances. CAe 
LUAT CUA NUOC CONG HOA XA HOI CHU NGffiA VIETNAM [LAWS OF THE SOCIALIST REpUBLIC OF 
VIETNAM}, NXB CIDNH TR! Quoe OIA (1999); CAe PHAP LENH CUA UY BAN THUONG VU Quoe 
HOI Nuoc CONG HOA XA HOI CHU NGHIA VIETNAM [ORDINANCES OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SOCIALIST REpUBLIC OF VIETNAM}, NXB CIDNH TR! Quoe OIA 
(1999,{. 
Levien Do, Vietnam IS Revised Constitution: Impact on Foreign Investment, in VIETNAM 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 120 (Carlye A. Thayer & David O. Marr, eds., 1993). 
7 The Vietnamese Constitution will be amended in 2002 and restructuring of the courts 
(Chapter X) is the primary focus -of the amendments. Interview with Nguyen Ai Can, Program 
Officer, UNDP, in Hanoi, Vietnam (July 10, 2001). 
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objective.' Finally, lack of general coordination results in a various aims 
of the government writing conflicting and overlapping regulations that 
create more discretion for officials on the ground.' Information sharing is 
also limited and this creates difficulty for officials at all levels to know 
the current state of regulation. The result is uneven application of current 
laws and regulations. 
A survey of legislative changes could be helpful in understanding 
the general trend in the development of Vietnam's new legal system, but 
unfortunately a survey of legislation alone could also be less lucid in 
explaining what is actually happening. That is to say, legislation and 
legislative changes are not irrelevant, but then again, not wholly relevant, 
either. In fact what is happening on the ground is that the existing 
bureaucratic structures routinely fall behind the market. In an effort to 
keep pace, the National Assembly and the Government develop very 
broad legal frameworks that leave, for the most part, local officials to use 
their own discretion in the implementation of broad policy directions and 
the resolution of disputes. While there is certainly recognition by 
policymakers that eliminating levels of bureaucratic interference is 
important, administrative discretion remains the tool of the day. While 
this can assure rapid resolution of disputes, it also leaves the door open to 
corruption and official misconduct. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND THE FORMAL 
SYSTEM 
The constitutional structures of governance in Vietnam are 
familiar to an observer of political structures in socialist countries. 1O 
Though left unspoken in much of the constitutional literature, the 
Communist party maintains fIrm control over government and legal 
institutions at all levels. There are parallel structures linking the 
This observation is shared by Bergling. See PER BERGLING, LEGAL REFORM AND 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE: THE VIE1NAMESE EXPERIENCE (1999). 
9 The latest examples of which are the proposed regulations from the State Bank of 
Vietnam that would reverse the existing Land Law's stance on market based pricing of land. In 
order to reduce fraud and improve lending practices, the State Bank is proposing that for the 
purposes of collateral, all land be assigned values by the central government rather than using 
market prices for land. See SBV to Continue with Flexible Management Policies and Bank 
Restructuring, VIE1NAM ECONOMIC TIMEs, July 25, 2001 (Vietnam News Brief Service, reI. July 
26,2001). 
10 In the Constitutions of many socialist countries, there are two essential components. First 
is a statement of political philosophy and national aspirations. These typically include a recitation 
of familiar rights that, in practice, do not exist. These include the right to freedom of speech and 
association, the right to work, etc. Second, is an exposition of the structure of government and state 
institutions. This explication in the 1992 Constitution is limited to an explication of the structure of 
Vietnam's government and state institutions. 
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government side to the Party. The Party makes its priorities known 
through a variety of statements and treatises, the most important of which 
is the Party Congress that meets every five years to map out general 
policy directions. On a day-to-day basis, the Politburo and the Central 
Committee exert influence over the institutions of the government and the 
legal system as they propose legislation and regulations. and carry out 
their normal duties ... 
It is, of course, now almost cliche to say that traditional socialist 
systems used the "plan," rather than markets and prices, to allocate 
resources between competing objectives. 'The five-year economic plan 
was as much a political statement as it was a plan about resource 
allocation. It was through the plan that the Party was able to most clearly 
spell out its priorities. National ownership of industries, with the 
exception of the smallest household firms, was a structural device to 
attempt to assure a more efficient implementation of the plan. As a result 
of the predominant role of state-owned enterprises in production and 
commerce, commercial and civil disputes were all in one way or another 
related to the plan - getting access to resources to meet a plan target or 
getting access to markets to dispose of production. Prices were simple 
accounting fictions used by the planning commissions to move resources 
back and forth among enterprises. Under central planning, commercial 
disputes were resolved internally by a bureaucratic body, called the 
Economic Arbitration Center. The Economic Arbitration Center 
reviewed production plans and made determinations about how best to 
resolve disputes between enterprises in accordance with the plan. lI 
Under orthodox central planning, governmental structures, like 
the National Assembly, the People's Court, and the State Prosecutor's 
Office were all niceties that typically served the plan and the Party. 
Constitutionally at least, the most important body in the government of 
Vietnam is the National Assembly. However, there is never much doubt 
about the internal driving force behind policymaking and the role of the 
Communist Party in agenda setting. Constitutionally, the National 
Assembly meets only twice a year for a total of two months.12 When the 
National Assembly is not in session, the Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly is empowered to act on behalf of the Assembly.ll The 
National Assembly and the Standing Committee both operate on the basis 
II For more on the bureaucracy of central planning see JANOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST 
SYSTEM (1992). For-more on the functioning of the Economic Arbitration Centers under central 
planning, see John Gillespie, Private Commercial Rights in Vietnam: A Comparative Analysis, 30 
STAN. J. iNT'LL. 325 (1994). 
12 Hien Phap Nuoe Gong Hoa Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Vietnam 1992 [Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic a/Vietnam 1992], No. 68 LCTIHDNN8, ch. 6, art. 86 (Apr. 18, 1992). 
13 [d., ch. 6, art. 90. 
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of the principle of 'democratic centralism' that guarantees that the Party 
can maintain firm control over the agenda.14 
The Supreme People's Court, the State Prosecutor and the 
Government are all on equal constitutional footing just below the 
National Assembly. The National Assembly is responsible for appointing 
and monitoring the activities ofthese institutions, including the naming of 
the Prime Minister, the Chief Judge and Chief Prosecutor as well as 
ministers in the Government. In practice, the scope for movement and 
creativity by the National Assembly is limited by constraints of time and 
the principle of democratic centralism. 
While it is not much of a proactive force, the National Assembly 
can be reactive. As a result, in recent years, the monitoring function has 
become more and more interesting as deputies to the assembly take 
advantage of the question period to ask at times sensitive questions about 
the performance of the government and the courts. At times, the 
Assembly has also rejected candidates for minister and declined to pursue 
particular pieces of legislation. Is 
14 Id, ch. I, art. 6. "Democratic centralism is a uniquely socialist construct whereby the 
direction of debate and discussion is determined at the central1evel, and then debate and decision 
making within the limits established is permitted. Non-agenda items are not pelTIlitted. The result 
is that all questions before the National Assembly must originate from the Standing Committee and 
the Standing Committee receives its direction from the Politburo. For more on the principle of 
democratic centralism, see KORNAl, supra note 11. 
IS For example, the National Assembly gave a vote of no confidence to the State Bank's 
Governor in 1998 and declined to pass legislation to amend the criminal law in 2001. 
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A. Supreme People's Court 
The courts are divided into a number of types including a military 
court, criminal courts, civil courts, economic courts, labor courts, 
administrative courts, and a set of appeal courts. I' Courts of first instance 
are organized at the county and provincial levels with the seriousness of 
the offenses determining jurisdiction over cases. I7 There are multiple 
levels of appeals: first, courts at the provincial level act as the first courts 
of appeals for cases originating in the county courts; second, there are 
three regional appellate courts - in Hanoi, Danang and Ho Chi Minh City; 
finally, there is the Supreme People's Court in Hanoi. I ' The appeals 
process was first articulated with regard to criminal prosecutions. With 
the addition of new court responsibilities, the courts have articulated the 
appeals process for each type of case. In criminal cases, it is important to 
note that both the accused and the prosecution have the right to appeal 
findings of the court. This is true even when the accused has been found 
innocent. 19 
The Supreme People's Court may, at the suggestion of the 
Ministry of Justice, create additional courts at any given time to meet 
specific needs." Lower courts have dual reporting requirements: 
vertically to the Supreme People's Court and horizontally to the People's 
16 Lua! To Chuc TOG An Nhan Dan [Law on the Organization of the People's Courts], No. 
02L/ern, ch. 2, art. 17 (Oct. 10, 1992). Economic cases and economic courts were added in a 
1994 amendment to the Law on the Organization of the People's Courts. Economic cases include 
bankruptcy and liquidation of firms. See Sua Doi, Bo Sung Mot So Dieu cuo Lua! To Chuc TOG An 
Nhan Dan [Amendments to the Law on the Organization o/the People's Courts], No. 29 LlCTN, art 
1, § 1 and art 1, § 15 (Jan. 10, 1994). Labor courts and administrative courts were added in a 1995 
amendment to the Law on the Organization of the Courts. See Sua Doi, Bo Sung Mot So Dieu cua 
Luat To Chuc Too An Nhan Dan [Amendments to the Law on the Organization of the People's 
CourtS;, No. 43 UCTN, art. 1, § 3 (Nov. 9, 1995). 
1 Jurisdictions of the courts were set out in the Criminal Law and in the Ordinance on 
Procedures for Resolving Economic Crimes. Cases where the possible sentences are less than 7 
years of confinement are first heard at the county and district level. Cases where the possible 
sentences are longer than seven years are heard first at the provinciallevel. See Sua Doi, Eo Sung 
Mot So Dieu cua Bo Luat To Tung Hinh Su [Amendments and Changes to the Criminal Law], No. 
05 UCTN, Part 3, eh. 15 (Jan. 2, 1993); Phap Lenh TllU Tue Giai Quyet Cae Vu An Kinh Te 
[Ordina1!ce on Procedures for Resolving Economic Disputes]. No. 31 UClN, ch. 2, art. 12-15 
(Mar. 29, 1994). 
18 Luat To Chuc Toa An Nhan Dan [Law on the Organization of the People's Courts], No. 
02UCTN, eh. 2, art. 22 and eh.3, art. 28 (Oct. 10, 1992). 
19 There is no protection against double jeopardy. See Sua Doi, Bo Sung Mot So Dieu cua 
Bo Luat To Tung Hinh Su [Amendments and Changes to the Criminal Law], Part 4, ch. 22, Jan. 2, 
1993, No. 05 UCTN. 
20 Sua Doi, Bo Sung Mot So Dieu cua Luat To Chuc Toa An Nhan Dan [Amendments to the 
Low on the Organization of the People's Courts], art. 1, § 12, Jan. 10, 1994, No. 29 UCTN. 
f 
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Councils at the provinciallevel.21 The budget for the Supreme People's 
Court is administered directly by the National Assembly. Provincial 
courts, however, are administered jointly by the Supreme People's Court 
and the Ministry of Justice." The funding of court operations raises 
important issues regarding the independence of the judiciary that are dealt 
with later. 
The court system has a two-tier appeal process with a third 
discretionary review. Most cases fmd their way into the courts at the 
county level. County courts are courts of general jurisdiction that handle 
all cases without regard to the specific nature of the offense or dispute. 
Determinations as to jurisdiction are made on the basis of the type of case 
and the potential sanction. For civil cases, where there is less than 50 
million Dong ($3,500) at issue, the court of first instance will be the 
county COurt.23 County courts also handle all criminal cases where the 
potential sentence is less than seven years." These types of minor cases 
make up the majority of cases entering the system." Any case involving a 
foreigner will automatically be heard in the Provincial People's Court." 
For cases entering the system at the county level, an appeal can be 
made to the provincial People's Courts. At the appeal level, the cases are 
distributed to one of five specialized courts - criminal, civil, economic, 
labor, or administrative - for resolution. Appeals of right are done on the 
record without argument. Following fmal appeal, should a party to the 
disputes want to appeal further, a petition for review can be sent to the 
Judge's Council of the Province (Uy ban Tham phan). The Provincial 
Judge's Council grants petitions for review on a discretionary basis. 
Appeals at the level of the Judge's Council are also accomplished with a 
review of the record without the benefit of oral argument. 
Cases of first instances in the provincial level are heard in either 
courts of general jurisdiction or one of the five specialized courts in the 
province. Decisions from these courts are subj ect to a single appeal as of 
right. These appeals are heard at one of three regional appeal courts of 
the Supreme People's Court. There are regional appeal courts in Hanoi, 
Danang and Ho Chi Minh City. From the regional courts, there is a fmal 
21 The People's Council is the provincial equivalent of the National Assembly. See Lua! To 
Chuc Toa An Nhan Dan [Law on the Organization a/the People's Courts], ch. 3, art. 31, Oct. 10, 
1992', No. 02UCTN. 
22 Id., ch. 6, art, 42-44. 
23 Phap Lenh Thu Tue Gia; Quyet Cae Vu An Kinh Te [Ordinance on the Procedures for 
Resolving Economic Disputes}, No. 31 UCTN (March 29,1994), ch. 2, art. 13. 
24 Sua Do;, Bo Sung Mot So Dieu cua Bo Lua! To Tung Hinh Su [Amendments and Changes 
to the Criminal Law}, No. 05 UCTN (Jan. 2,1993), ch. 15, art. 145. 
25 See the section titled Court Statistics, infra. 
26 Interview with Phan Tanh, Deputy Chief Judge, Ho Chi Minh City People's Court, in Ho 
Chi Minh City, Vietnaro (July 31, 2001). 
"" 
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discretionary review that can be made to the Judge's Council of· the 
Supreme People's Court in Hanoi. Like its provincial counterpart, 
reviews by the Judge's Council of the Supreme People's Court involve no 
oral arguments or appearances by the parties.27 
1. Court Statistics 
The nature and type of court activity is not surprising. According 
to courts statistics from national and selected provincial areas, court 
activity is evenly distributed among family matters (divorces, adoptions, 
etc), civil matters (including economic disputes between individuals and 
land disputes) and criminal cases. Labor and economic cases (disputes 
between companies) are differentiated from other civil disputes and make 
up a very small percentage of the total number of cases brought to court. . 
Civil cases tend to be of two types: land-related disputes between 
individuals and debt-related disputes." The civil courts handle cases 
where at least one of the parties is an individual. Family disputes tend to 
be divorce cases with associated land and property disputes." Though 
some civil cases might, fact, turn out to be commercial disputes, 
commercial disputes are typically found in the economic courts and these 
cases account for a very small percentage of cases in the courts (less than 
I % of all court actions are commercial disputes, see Table 1). 
27 This description of Vietnam's court system was provided by Judge Tanh. ld. The system 
is also described in detail in Lua! To Chuc TOG An Nhan Dan [Law on the Organization of the 
People's Courts], No. 02UCTN (Oct 10, 1992). 
28 This description of the content of civil cases relates to Ho Chi Minh City, though it is 
likely representative. ld. 
29 Bao Cao Cua Chanh An TOG Nhan Dan Toi Cao Tai Ky Hop Thu 8 Quae Hoi Khoa X Ve 
Cong Tae TOG An [Report of the Chief Judge of the Supreme People's Court at the Eighth Meeting 
of the Jdh Session of the National Assembly Regarding the Work of the Courts]. No. 02 BCNP, at 
14 (Oct 20, 2000) [hereinafter Report at the Eighth Meeting]. See also id. 
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Special categories of criminal cases are identified for particular 
attention, including corruption cases, smuggling, drug-related cases and 
prostitution. These special category cases make up approximately 20% 
of all criminal cases. Of these, drug related cases are growing rapidly, 
alone accounting for 15% of all criminal cases, but that distribution is not 
even. The Supreme People's Court reports that in some provinces, nearly 
70% of all criminal cases are drug related; in the northern province of Lai 
Chau near the Chinese border, two-thirds of the prison population are 
reportedly being jailed for drug-related offenses." 
Less than I % of cases received were related to administrative 
disputes." The Chief Judge of the Supreme Court noted in his report to 
the National Assembly that the number of administrative cases presently 
being heard does not reflect the true demand for the administrative courts. 
Rather, burdensome filing requirements tend to act a filter to prevent 
large numbers of cases from being accepted by the administrative courts 
for hearing." 
What is remarkable in the national court statistics and the 
statistics available from the city of Hue is that so few disputes that make 
it as far as the courts are settled by the parties out-of-court. Of cases that 
were filed in the Hue courts, more than 80% ultimately went to court for a 
decision." Provincial courts report that only 3.2% of all civil cases are 
settled out of court. Central level courts (appeal courts) report that only 
1.9% of cases are settled out of court." Judges interviewed commented 
that the nature of disputes (personal debtllandlfamily-related) in the civil 
courts made them difficult to settle out of court." Cases identified as 
being related to economic disputes have a much better chance of out of 
court settlement. In 2000, the Supreme People's Court report that 51.7% 
of all cases filed with the economic courts were settled prior to tria!." Ho 
30 Report at the Eighth Meeting, supra note 29, at 14. 
31 While Administrative cases are supposed to deal with complaints against official acts by 
government officials, nearly all of the 24 cases displayed in the April 2001 docket of the Ho Chi 
Minh City Administrative Court were land-related disputes between individuals. 
32 Bao Cao Gua Chanh An Toa Nhan Dan Tol Cao Tal Ky Hop Thu 6 Quoe Hoi Khoa X Ve 
Gong Tae Toa An [Report of the Chief Judge of the Supreme People's Court at the Sixth Meeting of 
the Jdh Session of the National Assembly Regarding the Work of the Courts), No. 167 BCNP, at 
23-24 (Oct. 22. 1999) [hereinafter Report at the Sixth Meeting]. 
II Compare this to nearly the reverse result in US courts. 
34 These statistics are at odds with other statements in the report that state "there are courts 
in the country that report between 60-70% of civil cases settled out of court." Report at the Eighth 
Meeting. supra note 29, at 13-15. 
35 Interview with Phan Tanh, supra note 26. 
36 Report at the Eighth Meeting, supra note 29. at 13-15. 
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Chi Minh City, which accounts for more than 50% of all economic cases, 
reportedly settles between 60-70% of all economic cases out. of court." 
What seems clear from the limited amount of data publicly 
available is that since 1994 there has been rapid growth in the number of 
civil and family cases brought to the formal legal system for resolution. 
In 1994, there were some 50,000 civil and family cases in the courts. By 
2000, this figure had risen to more than 110,000 cases. 
The Supreme People's Court complains that it is short of qualified 
judges. According to a report by the Chief Judge of the Court to the 
National Assembly in May 2000, the national court system need more 
than 1,570 judges in order to relieve a growing backlog of cases." The 
Supreme People's Court in Hanoi reported that it receives 800 new cases 
from provincial courts every month and that its 97 judges have a backlog 
of2,000 cases." 
The Chief Judge recently requested that the National Assembly 
pass a law that would increase the jurisdiction of courts at the county 
level, thereby moving more work away from the provincial level and 
down to the county level. It is not clear that this would be effective in 
reducing the backlog of cases at the highest level. It is also not clear 
whether these courts are currently being taxed. According to statistics 
from the Supreme People's Court for 2000, the average number of 
completed cases per judge at the Supreme Court is 8.7 per month. Unlike 
in the courts of first instance where one judge is assigned to each case, at 
the Supreme Court, three judge panels on appeal cases are more common. 
This means that judges at the highest level are hearing on average 24 
cases per month - seven to eight times as many as at the lower levels. 
Provincial Courts, on average, seem to have the lowest average 
number of cases per judge at just over 3. The data assembled below from 
a number of jurisdictions show a large range in the distribution of work. 
For example, the six judges in Ho Chi Minh City's Economic Court 
handled 500 economic cases in 2000, or 58% of all the economic cases in 
37 Ho Chi Minh City'S Chief Judge for the Economic Court reports that more than 3/4 of all 
cases that reach the courts are 'clear'; for example, one side defaults on a loan payment, or one side 
has completed its obligations under the contract but is not paid. Interview with Pham Xuan Tho, 
ChiefJudge, Ho Chi Minh City Economic Court, in Ho Chi Minh City. Vietnam (July 31. 2001). 
38 Vietnamese Legal System Lacks Judges, PHD NU TP HeM, May 17, 2000 (Vietnam 
News Brief Service, reI. May 18, 2000). 
39 Toa Tol Cao Thuong Xuyen Bi Ton Khoang 2,000 An [Supreme Court Has Continuing 
Backlog of Around 2.000 Cases}, Tuor TRE, June 19, 2001, at 3; QH: Tiep Tue Do; Thoa; Thang 
Than va Dan Chu Ve Nhung Van De Cu Tri Quan Tam [N.A.: Continuing the Frank and 
Democratic Discussion About the Concerns o/Constituents}, SAIGON GIAI PHONO, June 19,2001, 
at 1 [hereinafter Frank and Democratic Discussion]; Chua Thong Qua Eo Luat To Hung Hinh Su 
Sua Dot, Eo Sung [Amended Criminal Law Not Yet Passed}. NOVO! LAO DONG, June 12,2001, at 
3. 
2002] LEGAL REFORM AND ITS CONTEXT IN VIETNAM 235 
the country, with an average caseload of nearly seven cases per judge per 
month:" The average caseload varies across jurisdiction and level of the 
system (See Tables 2 to 6), For example, outside of the main cities ofHo 
Chi Minh City, Hanoi, Danang and Hai Phong, very few, if any, cases are 
heard by the provincial economic courts," 
40 
" 
Interview with Pham Xuan Tho, supra note 37. 
Report at the Eighth Meeting, supra note 29. 
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Table 3: Average Monthly Case Load Per Judge (2000) 
Judges' Average Caseload/Month 
County 4,217 4.61 
Provincial 1,092 3.03 
Central 97 8.68 
Military *** *** 
Table 4: People's Court of Ho Chi Minh City (2000) 
Cases Received Cases Resolved 
Criminal 10,323 (33.5%) 8,628 
Civil 9,914 (32.1 %) 8,286 
Family 9,669 (31.3%) 8,082 
Economic 512 (1.7%) 428 
Labor 332 (1.1%) 277 
Administrative 112 (0.36%) 94 
Total 30,862 25,795 
Total Number of Judges 500 500 
Average CaseloadlMonth 5.14 4.30 
Report at the Eighth Meeting, supra note 29, at 23. 
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Table 5: People's Court of Hue 
Criminal 
Statistics, Jan-June 2001 a 
Cases Completed 
67 
Appeals Requested 
Civil 
Pre-trial Settlements 
Family 
Administrative 
Other 
Total 
Total Number of Judges 
Average Caseload/Month 
Table 6: Ca Mau Province 
56 
11 
140 
2 
235 
7 
5.6 
Provincial Level 
Statistics, Jan..June 2001 b 
Case Resolved 
235 
County Level 
Total 
Total Number of Judges 
Averagc'Caseload/Month 
53.5% 
204 
46.5% 
439 
29 
2.5 
[15:2 
Cases Received 
82 
6 
115 
231 
6 
1 
435 
7 
10.35 
Cases Received 
319 
58.2% 
229 
41.8% 
548 
29C 
3.1 
a TAND Thanh Pha Hue: So Ket Hoat Dong Xet Xu 6 Thang Dau Nam [Hue 
City People's Court: Sunumuy of Activities for First Six Months of the Year], Phap Luat, July 14, 
2001, at 1. 
b Ca Mall: Co Nhieu Tien Bo Trang Viee Xet Xu An Hinh Su, Dan Su [Ca 
Mall: Many Improvements in Dealing with Criminal and Civil Cases]. Phap Luat, July 13, 2001, at 
5. 
c There are also 38 members of the local bar in Ca Mall Province. Telephone 
Interview with representative of the Cau Mall Province Department of Justice (July 18, 2001). 
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The Supreme Court has voiced a complaint to the National 
Assembly on an annual basis that it lacks judges for the system. Given 
the apparently low rate of cases handled per month per judge, it does not 
appear, at first glance, that this claim is well founded. Rather, it seems 
that the allocation of judges is not in balance with the workload, so that 
there are judges in some parts of the country who are overloaded with 
cases, while there are judges in other parts of the country with little to do. 
Ofthe 5,406 judges in Vietnam only 500, or 9%, are in Ho Chi Minh City 
while that city accounts for 21 % of all court activity. At the same time, 
there are provinces where, for example, no economic cases were heard at 
all during 2000.42 
During the most recent National Assembly session, deputies were 
asked to vote on a reform of the criminal law that would increase the 
number of potential cases that might be heard in district and county 
levels. Under existing rules, cases with potential jail terms of more than 7 
years are heard first at the provincial level. District level courts are only 
allowed to hear cases where the maximum possible penalty is less than 7 
years. Under the proposal, district level courts would be the court of first 
instance for all criminal cases where the maximum possible jail term is 15 
years. Deputies expressed vocal disbelief that increasing the case load of 
the lower courts would resolve the national backlog that the Supreme 
Court has complained about. The identified backlog is mostly for appeals 
and not for cases of first instance at the provincial level. Some deputies 
expressed a concern that such a reform might well reduce the backlog at 
the Supreme People's Court, but then create a larger volume of appeals at 
the provincial level as county judges are not generally well-trained and 
might not even be capable of correctly handling complex cases. The 
proposed reform to the Criminal Law was ultimately tabled by the 
Standing Committee of the National Assembly and not brought to a 
vote." 
2. Judicial Independence 
The administrative structure and the unspoken role of the 
Communist Party ensure that to the degree to which there is judicial 
42 Report at the Eighth Meeting, supra note 29, at 23. 
43 In the alternative, the Chief Judge asked for 20 more judges for the Supreme Court to 
eliminate its backlog. This alternative was also rejected. See: Chua Thong Qua Lua! Sua Doi Bo 
Sung Mot So Dieu Cua Bo Lua! To TUng Hinh Su [Amendments to the Criminal Law Not Yet 
Passed}. SAIGON GIAI PHONG, June 12,2001, at 1; Frank and Democratic Discussion, supra note 
39, at 1. 
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independence, particularly at the local level, it is more form than 
function.44 There are many potential levers of influence over the outcome 
of proceedings. The administrative structure governing judges ensures 
that in necessary cases, judges can be influenced. Judges are very 
sensitive to the precariousness of their positions. Unlike most civil 
servants who enjoy quasi-lifelong appointments, judges are limited to 
five-year terms." Particularly at the provincial level,'uncooperative' 
judges can fmd themselves without an appointment at the end of their 
five-year term. Alternatively, judges that rack up large numbers of citizen 
complaints can find it difficult to acquire a reappointment at the end of 
their five-year term. 
Through the reappointment process, the local political 
establishment has leverage to indirectly influence judges. At the end of 
the five-year appointment, each judge is required to submit a petition for 
re-employment. A committee, including representatives of various 
government departments, the People's Council, and the People's Court, 
reviews the petitions and makes recommendations to the People's 
Council, which then reappoints judges for an additional five year term.46 
As in most other decision making bodies in Vietnam, the Reappointment 
Committee runs by consensus. This creates ample opportunity for local 
government to stop appointments should it feel the need. The incentive 
for local and provincial judges to be sensitive to the needs of local 
government opinion with regard to cases of interest is, as a result, high. 
Local commentators have noted that the rapid development of 
new laws and government regulations and the still bureaucratic nature of 
governance often leave judges in the dark as to the current status of the 
law and regulations. As a result, when faced with unfamiliar cases and 
new situations, judges tend to defer to the provincial or national 
governments, often seeking an informal opinion on the state of the law.47 
Where the government is a mere disinterested observer, asking for the 
opinion of the government might not be so critical. Where the local 
government has an obvious stake in the outcome (for example, in a 
commercial dispute involving a provincially-owned state enterprise), 
44 During an interview, the Communist Party Chief of Thanh Haa Province makes it clear 
that instructions to the judiciary for pursuing a corruption case originate from his office. Thanh Hoa 
Co Kien Quyet Xu Ly Vu An Kinh Te Lon Nhat Tu Truoe Toi Nay Cua Tinh? [Can Thanh Hoa 
Province Forcefully Prosecute Its Largest Ever Economic Crime?], PHAP LUAT, July 16, 2001, at l. 
45 Phap Lenh Ve Tharn Phan va Hoi Tharn Toa An Nhan Dan [Ordinance Regarding Judges 
and the People's Jury], No. 16 UCTN, ch. 3, art 19 (May 26,1993). 
46 Information on the reappointment process was provided by Chief Judge Tho. Interview 
withPham Xuan Tho, supra note 37. 
47 Tran Quae, Please All Rise for the Honourable Judge, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, 
Nov. 9, 1998 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
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however, its interpretation of the current state of the law becomes less 
credible. 
While the previous discussion focuses on judges at the provincial 
and district levels, the same incentives face judges at the central level as 
well. Even at the national level, there is recognition that judicial 
independence is non-existent, at least in the way it is defined in the 
West." At a recent meeting of the National Assembly, deputies 
questioned the Chief Judge of the Supreme People's Court about the 
quality of the management and judicial knowledge of the lower courts. 
The Chief Judge responded by referring the deputies to the Ministry of 
Justice since. the "Supreme People's Court does not manage the 
Provincial People's Courts."" 
B. People's Office a/Supervision and Control 
The People's Office of Supervision and Control, or the People's 
Prosecutor, is the agency designated with the task of carrying out public 
prosecutions, including regulating and limiting the . power of the 
govermnent. The People's Prosecutor is administratively distinct from 
the Ministry of Justice and reports to the National Assembly on a semi-
annual basis.so In theory, the People's Prosecutor is independent of the 
Ministry of Justice; in practice, the distinction between the two is much 
less clear, particularly as one moves to the local level. . 
The People's Prosecutor has very broad powers of investigation. 
The People's Prosecutor has a mandate to investigate any matter before 
the courts, any govermnental activity and any private activity where it 
believes there might be some violation of the laW.'1 This has at times 
resulted in the 'criminalization' of common civil matters and the criminal 
prosecution of parties to civil disputes and is likely part of the reason why 
48 Bergling quotes former Vice Chairman for the National Assembly Phung Van Tuu as 
arguing that "in order to ensure an efficient reform of the judicial agencies, the pivotal thing is to 
further enhance the Party's leadership over the judicial agencies in all domains: policy making, 
trial, land] the assignment of cadres." BERGLING, supra note 8, at 140. 
9 Toa To; Cao Thuong Xuyen Bi Ton Khoang 2,000 An [Supreme Court Has Continuing 
Backlog of Around 2,000 CasesJ, TuOI1RE, June 19, 2001, at 3. 
50 Hien Phap NUDe Cong Hoa Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Vietnam 1992 [Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1992J, No. 68 LCTIHDNN8, ch. X, art. 139 (Apr. 18, 1992). The 
formal English translation for Vien Kiem Sat Nhan Dan is the Supreme People's Procuracy. 
According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, a Procurator is ... "4) one who represents a religious 
society in its legal matters." Rather than repeat the use this term, I have used the more common 
Prosecutor, which is likely closer than Procurator to the actual function of the Vien Kiem Sat Nhan 
Dan. 
slid, ch. X, art. 137. 
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businessmen seek to avoid bringing disputes to the courts." McMillan 
reports that businessmen state the opinion that bringing cases to courts 
involves the authorities and "creates problems for [them] rather than 
support [them]. 53 
The People's Prosecutor has the prerogative to participate in any 
part of judicial proceedings with the exception of settlement conferences. 
Usually, its participation involves a review of the case file and listening to 
evidence and argument. At the conclusion of the argument by both sides, 
the Prosecutor will make a recommendation to the trial judge about the 
resolution of the dispute. Where there are questions of criminal 
wrongdoing raised by the proceeding, the Prosecutor has the right to refer 
parts of the case to the criminal court for resolution." Of the ten civil 
cases observed by the author in July 2001, the Prosecutor was present at 
all but one case. 
The broad ranging powers of the People's Prosecutor do not stop 
at the investigation of civil disputes. Because it can participate in all civil 
and administrative disputes before the courts, the Prosecutor's Office can 
wield very strong powers of persuasion against a particular party from 
pursuing further appeals, often issuing legal opinions to concerned parties 
that further appeals would be groundless or not successful." 
The Prosecutor's Office is also assigned the power of review of 
government actions. This power extends to reviewing all government 
decrees and regulations for their legality, something akin to the process of 
judicial review in the United States. Where the Office is able to identifY 
potentially illegal actions or practices undertaken by state agencies, the 
Office can issue instructions and orders to those offices to stop illegal 
activities and to amend practices that are deemed illegal." This review 
can take the form of an instruction to rescind or amend policies or actions 
deemed illegal with an accompanying threat to pursue prosecution should 
the local authorities not comply. In practice, this has meant that the 
52 For examples of criminal prosecutions of parties to civil disputes see: Nguoi Bf Hai Co 
DUDe Boi Thuong? [Will Those Who Have Been Injured Be Compensated?], NovO! LAO DONG, 
June 12, 2001 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
53 John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, Dispute Prevention Without Courts in 
Vietnam, 15 J L ECON & ORO 637,641 (1999). 
54 For description of the role of the prosecutor in both criminal and civil trials, see Lua! To 
Chuc Vien Kiem Sat Nhan Dan [Law of the Organization of the People's Prosecutor}. No. 03 
L/CTH, ch. 4 (Oct. 10, 1992) and Interview with Pham Xuan Tho, supra note 37. 
55 This power of persuasion can often be used to protect parochial ends. See Pha; Chang 
Con Co Nhung Dong Minh Giau Mat? [Are There Still Some Allies Hiding Their Faces?], PHAP 
LUAT, July 23, 2001, at 9. 
56 Luat To Chuc Vien Kiem Sat Nhan Dan [Law of the Organization of the People's 
Prosecutor], No. 03 uern, ch. 2, art. 8-10 (Oct. 10, 1992). See also Quoe hoi Pha; Lam Chue 
Nang Chinh La Lap Phap [National Assembly Must Write the Laws], TuOl TRE, JWle 21, 2001, at 1. 
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Prosecutor's Office reviews government decisions and policies at all 
levels for their correctness in relation to the law. Rather than actually 
pursue prosecutions, the Prosecutor's Office will negotiate with local 
administrative agencies to reach a conclusion that it can justify as 
complying with the letter of the law or regulation. 
For example, in an attempt to more effectively manage the 
resolution of citizen complaints, the Mayor of Ho Chi Minh City recently 
delegated the authority to resolve citizen complaints to the office of the 
Inspector General's Office. The People's Prosecutor Office. soon issued 
an opinion that the mayor could only delegate individual cases for 
resolution, not delegate authority. to resolve all cases." In another 
example of how this power can be used, the Prosecutor's Office in Gia 
Lai Province reviewed 270 provincial government decisions and policies 
and found 86 of them to be in violation of existing law. The Prosecutor's 
Office ordered the offending policies and decisions rescinded." This 
order was then followed by a series of negotiations between the city 
administration and the Prosecutor's Office in an attempt to find a 
solution. 
1. Prosecutorial Independence 
With such potentially wide-ranging powers, one might expect that 
the People's Prosecutor would playa more important role in governance. 
However, like the judiciary, the formal independence of the prosecutor's 
office can be eroded. The Prosecutor Office is similar to the People's 
Court in that it has both vertical and horizontal reporting requirements. 
Horizontally, provincial· and local prosecutors must report to local 
People's Councils. Also, similar to the People's Courts, budgets and 
personnel decisions at the provincial level are shared between the local 
Departments of Justice and the People's Prosecutor in Hanoi.59 This 
creates almost a double hori;wntal reporting requirement that can act to 
constrain zealous prosecutors. Prosecut6rs, like judges, also face a five-
year limit on their term of office.60 The term limitation and the 
reappointment process also act to constrain prosecutors who might 
57 De Nghi Bai Bo Mot So Noi Dung Trang Viec Uy Quyen Giai Quyet Khieu Nai 
[Recommendation to Change Some Methods for Delegating the Resolution of Complaints], SAIGON 
GIAI PHONG, June 3, 2001, at p. 5. 
58 Nhieu Van Ban Sal Pham Da DUDe Huy Bo [Many Incorrect Documents Are Rescinded}. 
PHAPLUAT, July 27, 2001, at I. 
59 Lua! To Chuc Vien Kiem Sat Nhan Dan [Law on the Organization of the People's Office 
a/Supervision], No. 031/CTN, ch. 7, art. 35 (Oct. 10,1992). 
60 [d, ch. I art. 7. 
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otherwise attempt to undermine the official power structure through their 
investigatory powers. 
Nevertheless, the increasing breadth of activities of the People's 
Prosecutor have become the subject of a significant amount of public 
discussion as to whether or not the Prosecutor's broad ranging powers 
should be curbed in the future. It is possible that in the near future, as 
part of a pending constitutional amendment, that the People's Prosecutor 
will find its power to investigate and pass on government action limited 
or reduced in a significant way. 61 
C. Ministry of Justice - Government 
As part of the government, the Ministry of Justice is distinct from 
either the People's Court or the Prosecutor Office. The Ministry of 
Justice is in a minor position relative to the two constitutional bodies of 
the People's Court and the People's Prosecutor. However, in terms of 
administrative competence, the Ministry of Justice is responsible for 
managing and budgeting all of the People's Courts." Below the national 
level, the division between the government and the judiciary quickly 
begins to disappear as the responsibilities for budgeting and management 
of the courts and the pro curacy fall more clearly into the sphere of the 
provincial Departments of Justice. At the provincial level the tensions 
between vertical and horizontal relationships (between the central 
government's Ministry of Justice and the provincial governments) 
become apparent. 
In the Vietnamese bureaucratic system, the control over 
provincial operations is mostly delegated by the provincial governments, 
with local Departments of Justice maintaining only a formal reporting 
relationship with the Ministry. Personnel and budgetary matters lie 
largely within the prerogative of the provincial governments. 
While the budgeting of the Supreme People's Court and the State 
Prosecutor's Office is undertaken directly by the National Assembly, 
budgeting for the Provincial People's Courts and Provincial State 
Prosecutor's office is undertaken by the local Departments of Justice 
through the provincial governments. While both of these organizations 
are theoretically independent of the government, lack of administrative 
capacity requires both of these organizations to rely on local government 
for access to the fmancial resources required to undertake their day-to-day 
61 Quae hoi Phai Lam Chuc Nang Chinh La Lap Phap [National Assembly Must Write the 
Laws], TuOIThE, June 21, 2001, at 1. 
62 Lua! To Chuc Toa An Nhan Dan [Law on the Organization of the People's Courts], No. 
02UClN, ch. 1, art. 16 (Oct 10, 1992). 
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activities. As a result, these organizations are sensitive to the concerns of 
local governments. 
The local governments and Departments of Justice maintain 
significant control over the judiciary and judicial appointments. While 
lists of potential appointees to the Supreme People's Court are draw up by 
the . Standing Committee of the National Assembly, they must be 
approved by a committee, including representatives of the Ministry of 
Justice, the Ministry of Defense," the Fatherland Front," and the Bar 
Association." At the provincial level, the Minister of Justice, on the 
advice of the local director of the Departmeut of Justice, is responsible for 
nominating judges to a similar committee. At the district and county 
levels, the head of provincial local Department of Justice is responsible 
for nominating Judges." The same committee must approve 
reappointments of judges after five year. 
Control over the courts is not limited to the budgetary processes 
and selection of judges. Local Party Committees and provincial 
governments can have significant influence over the outcomes of 
particular cases. Judges serve together with 'citizen jurors' on a panel, 
typically consisting of one professional judge and two jurors for criminal 
trials in the first instance. Juries, the professional judges together with the 
'citizen jurors,' must decide cases based upon a majority vote. The 
Fatherland Front, a Communist Party front organization, selects the 
'citizen jurors' to participate on the panels. The selection criteria for the 
Fatherland Front are political loyalty and reliability." The majority of 
'citizen jurors' are nominated by a Communist Party front organization, 
effectively giving the Party the ability to control outcomes in cases in 
which it has a strong interest. 
As a result, the potential for real judicial independence is 
effectively minimized and power is moved from the courts to the Ministry 
of Justice, the provincial governments, and the Communist Party. Where 
provincial governments have substantial commercial interests before the 
courts, the alignment of interests behind the provincial governments calls 
63 The Ministry of Defense is consulted directly with regard to the selection of Military 
judges for the Military tribunals, which fall under the supervision of the Supreme People's Court. 
64 The Fatherland Front is a Communist Party front organization. In addition to organizing 
various grassroots groups, the Fatherland Front is responsible for vetting candidates to the National 
Assembly. 
65 The Bar Association is organized on a provincial level with a national coordinating body. 
Membership to the bar is highly restricted. Phap Lenh Ve Tharn Phan va Hoi Tharn Too An Nhan 
Dan [Ordinance Regarding Judges and the People's Jury}, No. 16 UCIN, ch. 3, art 21 (May 26, 
1993). 
" Id, ch. 3, art. 22-23. 
" Id., ch. 4, art. 29-30. 
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into question whether and how parties can seek adequate resolution of 
their disputes in the provincial courts. 
1. Enforcement of Judgments 
The enforcement of civil judgments is an issue of concern in the 
context of legal reform in Vietnam, more so when it exposes the tensions 
between provincial governments and the central government. The 
procedures set in place to ensure the enforcement of judgments, on their 
face, seem not that different from those used in a number of countries, 
including the United States. However, it is interaction of the procedures 
with the local administrative structures where the stresses between the 
vertical and horizontal reporting structures common in socialist countries 
are most obvious. In answering a question before the National Assembly 
about the enforcement of judgments, Ha Minh Tri, Vietnam's Chief 
Prosecutor said: 
The enforcement of civil judgments in the past has always been 
closely monitored and undertaken in a timely fashion. Of course, there 
are some cases related to provincial People's Committees [provincial 
government executive bodies 1 where judgments have not been enforced 
because the Province has a particular opinion about the judgment. With. 
regard to the cases where Provincial governments have particular 
opinions, the State Prosecutor's Office has researched the files and 
quickly given clear instructions to the local People's Committees. It's a 
shame that some Provincial People's Committees, after having received 
our instructions, and also instructions from the Supreme People's Court, 
that the People's Committees must enforce these judgments according to 
the law, that they do not enforce them. The State Prosecutor's Office sees 
clearly that Provincial People's Committees must be more serious, must 
better coordinate and support the enforcement of judgments." 
The tensions between local government players and central 
government players cause enforcement of judgments to run into 
difficulty. As a result, the ratio of judgments that are enforced is low. 
According to statistics from the Ministry of Justice's Department of 
Enforcement, some 3 7% of judgments in civil cases are, for one reason or 
another, unenforceable.69 The experience of Hai Duong Province in 
northern Vietnam seems to be typical. Over the first six months of200l, 
68 Ha Manh Tri VKSNDTC Tra Loi Chat Van Dai Bieu [Ha Minh Tri. State Prosecutor's 
Office Answers the Questions oj Deputies], PHAP LUAT, July 20,2001, at 5. 
69 Ha Anh, Co each Nao De Dam Bao Thi Hanh An? [Is There Any Way to Guarantee 
Enforcement a/Orders?], PHAP LUAT, July 4, 2001, at 5. 
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it enforced only 18% of the outstanding orders in the jurisdictions. The 
rest were described as "complicated" and were not enforced." 
The Ministry of Justice; through the provincial departments of 
justice, is responsible for enforcing judicial decisions. The provincial 
Departments of Justice have dual reporting functions. The fIrst loyalty of 
the-provincial department of justice, particularly at its higher levels is to 
the local Provincial People's Committees. The local governments are 
responsible for budgetary support, personnel, and facilities for the 
Department of Justice. The positions of director and vice director of the 
department must be approved by the local Personnel and Organization 
Department as well as the Provincial Communist Party cell. The Ministry 
of Justice provides only guidelines and general instructions down to the 
provincial level. Departments of Justice are required to provide reporting 
data on a monthly basis to both the local government and the Ministry of 
Justice. Each Provincial Department of Justice has an Enforcement 
Office that reports, through its director, both horizontally to the Provincial 
People's Committee and vertically to the Ministry of Justice's 
Department of Enforcement. 
Some commentators have observed that the national court system 
might potentially create a strong framework for the enforcement of 
judicial decisions. For example, Bergling notes that, in theory, a court in 
Hue could issue a judgment against a company in Ho Chi Minh City, 
thereby creating a potentially strongnationaljudiciary.l1 
While the jurisdiction of the People's Court judgments are 
national, the fact that enforcement of decisions falls under the rubric of 
local governments weakens the People's Court's ability to develop a 
strong national court system." In practice, the decision to actually 
enforce a judgment is left to the local government in the jurisdiction 
where the company fInds itself. The stress placed on enforcement 
officers to seek 'voluntary enforcement' can mean slow going for 
enforcement efforts when faced with a provincial government that is 
determined not to make payment. 73 
In the Vietuamese bureaucratic system, Provincial Governors and 
Ministers hold equivalent rank. Provincial governments and ministries 
also rank equally. This bureaucratic equality gives local governments 
70 Hai Duong Province reported enforcement of 1008 of 5474 outstanding judicial orders. 
See Hai Duong: So Ket Gong Tae Thi Hanh An Dan Su 6 Thang Dau Nam [Hai Duong: Review of 
Civil Enforcement in the First Six Months o/the Year] PHAPLUAT, July 27, 2001, at 5. 
71 BERGLING, supra note 8, at 132-133. 
72 Phap Lenh Thi Hanh An Dan Su [Ordinance on Enforcement o/Civil Judgments], No. l3 
UCTN, ch. 2, art. 12-17 (Apr. 26,1994). 
73 Thuy notes that voluntary enforcement is the preferred method of enforcement. See 
Nguyen, supra Table 1 note a, at 23. 
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ample opportunity to thwart enforcement against favored firms. The 
Ministry of Justice in its capacity as the Ministry of record (Bo chu quan) 
is able to exert only limited authority over a provincial government that is 
determined not to be bound by a decision. The authority of the Ministry 
of Justice seems to be particularly limited where the local party is a 
favored state enterprise. In many cases, if the Ministry of Justice can 
only request that the local government give enforcement of judicial orders 
due 'consideration' (quan tam). 
In a commercial dispute between a private company and the Phu 
Tho Trading Company, a provincial state company, a $15,000 
outstanding enforcement order was left open for more than two years. In 
1999, the Department of Judicial Enforcement at the Ministry of Justice 
sent official correspondence to the governor of the province asldng for his 
assistance in enforcing this order against the Phu Tho Trading Company. 
Through a variety of delaying tactics, the provincial government has 
succeeded in preventing enforcement of the order. 74 A common delaying 
tactic is to take advantage of the non-voluntary enforcement process. 
Before undertakllg non-voluntary enforcement, an Appraisal Committee, 
including representatives from the local government's Department of 
Finance and the department of record for the economic sector in question, 
must meet in order to determine a valuation for the assets of the party 
against whom there is a judgment. A local government can thwart 
enforcement simply by not sending representatives to participate in the 
committee. Should the local government participate in an Appraisal 
Committee it can reach the same result by undervaluing the assets of the 
local party in which it has an interest." 
The enforcement situation is made more difficult by the process. 
Rather than being automatically enforcing, the process requires that the 
party with the order attempt voluntary enforcement without outside 
intervention. Should that fail, a party with a judicial order may then 
petition the local Enforcement Office of the local Department of Justice 
for assistance in enforcing the judgment. 76 
Even at the enforcement stage, there are still avenues for appeal 
that can slow the process down furtller. For example, after a judgment 
has been ordered by the courts and the plaintiff has filed the petition for 
enforcement with the local Department of Justice, the defendant has the 
74 Phai Chang Con Co Nhung Dong Minh Giau Mat? [Are There Still Some Allies Hiding 
Their Faces?], PHAPLuAT, July 23,2001, at 9. 
75 For a description of the Appraisal Committee, see Phap Lenh Thi Hanh An Dan Su 
[Ordinance on Erifarcement aJCivii Judgments], No. 13 UCTN, ch. 4, art. 31 (Apr. 26, 1994). 
76 Jd, ch. 3, art. 18-19. 
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right to appeal the enforcement order to the local Department of Justice 
and then to the local People's Committee.77 
While, in theory, the petition should be accepted and the judgment 
enforced, there remains significant local discretion with regard to 
enforcement. . This discretion is, however, extralegal and typically does 
not result in a resolution or written document from the enforcement 
agency. Rather, the request to enforce may 'disappear,' or there may be 
an order from the local government not to enforce. 
A typical example of a 'complicated' case is that of the Thanh 
Hoa Border Trading Company. The Thanh Hoa Border Trading 
Company became involved in a contractual dispute with the Thanh Ha 
Hanoi Trading Company in 1995. The Thanh Hoa Border Trading 
Company is a state-owned enterprise from Thanh Hoa Province and the 
Thanh Ha Hanoi Trading Company is a private trading company based 
400 Ian away in Hanoi. The case went to the People's Court of Thanh 
Hoa Province where a judgment for nearly $100,000 was issued in favor 
of Thanh Ha Hanoi. Thanh Hoa Border Trading refused to pay the 
judgment and the local Department of Justice never pursued enforcement. 
Thanh Ha Hanoi appealed directly to the Ministry of Justice for 
assistance. The Ministry of Justice ultimately sent a delegation headed by 
a Vice Minister to call on the People's Committee of Thanh Hoa Province 
to enforce the order. As of 2001, six years after the judgment, it has yet 
to be enforced.78 
In another similar case, also in 1995, a foreign businessman 
successfully sued a state-owned enterprise in Khanh Hoa Province on the 
south-central coast. Although there were interventions from the Supreme 
Court in Hanoi, the State Prosecutor's Office, and even from the 
Enforcement Office of Ho Chi Minh City's Department of Justice on 
behalf of the investor, the People's Committee of Khanh Hoa Province 
refused to enforce the $50,000 judgment against its own company." 
These cases represent what is recognized by many within the 
government as a common response at the local level to judgments made 
against favored local firms. They also highlight a serious deficiency in 
the bureaucratic and legal systems in Vietnam that inhibits the 
development of a stronger judiciary. So long as judicial orders are treated 
as advisory, parties to disputes will be required to seek alternate non-
judicial avenues for resolution. 
77 Id., ch. 5, art. 44.2. 
78 Nhung Ban An "Troi" Tren Cap Treo [The Cases Stuck in the "Sky'], PHAP LUAT, July 
20,2001, at 1. 
79 Id 
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D. Arbitration Centers 
In addition to the formal court system there are a number of 
official arbitration bodies sanctioned by the government. The five 
arbitration centers presently licensed in Vietnam are the Vietnam 
International Arbitration Center (VIAC), the Saigon Economic 
Arbitration Center (SACENT), two centers in Hanoi, and one in rural Bac 
Giang province in the north." Arbitration centers, distinctly different 
from the Economic Arbitration Centers operated during central planning, 
were established in response to demand from foreign investors seeking an 
alternative to the domestic courts. The VIAC, an arm of the Vietnain 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, was established in 1993 to handle 
commercial disputes between Vietnamese and foreign parties. As such 
the VIAC is recognized by the government as an "International 
Arbitration Body."'! The Saigon Economic Arbitration Center was 
established in 1997 in the country's commercial capital to handle disputes 
primarily between Vietnamese parties.82 
Arbitration is an example of the contradictions in the Vietnamese 
legal system that has been the focus of complaints by observers both in 
and out for years. On the one hand, the government decree that 
established the Economic Arbitration Centers in 1992 makes it clear that 
"decisions of resolution of disputes of the Economic Arbitration Centers 
are effectively binding and may not be appealed."" On the other hand, 
the same decree allows, "where an arbitral award is notrespected by one 
party, the other party may petition the court of competent jurisdiction to 
resolve [the dispute] in accordance with the procedures for resolution of 
economic cases."" That is to say, if a party to the dispute disagrees with 
the outcome of arbitration, he has a right to take the dispute to the courts 
for further hearing. 
Enforcement powers of the arbitration body are left ambiguous in 
the government decree establishing the centers. Effective enforcement of 
arbitral awards is hampered further by a refusal by local enforcement 
80 Nguyen Hong, And the Winner Here Is ... Everyone Here, VIETNAM INVESTMENT 
REVIEW, Aug. 30, 1999 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
81 Vietnam is a signatory to the New York Convention. VIAe was afforded the special 
position of International Arbitration Center when it was established by Government Decision No 
204mg dated April 28, 1993. The VIAe replaced all other arbitration bodies existing at the time. 
For a summary of this decision, see Arbitration Forum to Resolve Civil Disputes, VIETNAM 
INVESTMENT REVIEW, Aug. 31, 1998 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
82 Interview with SACENT staff, in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (July 27, 2001). 
83 Nghi Dinh eua Chinh Phu So 1161CP Ve To Chuc va Hoat Dong euo Trong Tai Kinh Te 
[Government Decision No. 1161CP Regarding the Organization and Operation of Economic 
Arbitrators], No. 116/CP, ch. 1, art. 5 (Sept. 30, 1992). 
" Id, ch. 3, art. 31. 
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officials to recognize arbitral awards as anything other than advisory." 
The Ordinance' on Enforcement of Civil Judgments clearly spells out the 
responsibilities of enforcement personnel: They are required to carry out 
enforcement of civil judgments of the courts. The ordinance makes no 
mention of arbitral bodies." One judge noted that while there was a 
government directive establishing arbitration centers, the government 
neglected to establish a process by which arbitration awards can be 
accepted by the courts. B7 
These loopholes, or lack of regulatory gnidance, effectively 
emasculate the Arbitration Centers as effective dispute resolution bodies. 
Voluntary enforcement of decisions has resulted in arbitrators viewing 
their role as primarily that of a mediator rather than a judge." In practice, 
nearly all disputes in arbitration where one side doeS not accept the 
decision of the arbitrator end up going to court for resolution." 
Because of its special status as an "international arbitration 
center," the effectiveness of VlAC decisions is more limited than that of 
other arbitration centers. Vietuamese courts routinely refuse to hear 
appeals from VIAC decisions, stating that as an "international arbitration 
center" its decisions are [mal and cannot be reviewed by a Vietuamese 
court 90 Decisions of the VIAe are trapped in an odd Catch-22: no appeal 
allowed in the courts and no effective means of enforcing its own order. 
This situation takes away any threat of enforcement and means that the 
disputes that end up in Vietnam's largest arbitral body entirely can be 
resolved only on a voluntary basis. Decisions of 'domestic' arbitration 
bodies, on the other hand, can be appealed in the courts. Review by the 
courts, at least, leaves open an avenue for resolution of the case through 
the courts when arbitration proves ineffective. 
85 Interview with Ho Quang Nghia, Arbitration Judge, in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (July 
27, 2001); Interview with Pharo Xuan Tho, supra note 37. 
86 Phap Lenh Th; Hanh An Dan Su [Ordinance on Enforcement o/Civil Judgments]. No. 13 
UCTN, ch. 2, art. 14 (Apr. 26, 1994). 
87 Interview with Phan Tanh, supra note 26. See also Nguyen, supra Table 1 note a, at 12-
13. 
88 Judges freely accept that enforcement of arbitration awards in Vietnam is strictly 
voluntary. This forces judges to come up with decisions, not necessarily based in the law, that will 
be ac~table to both sides. Interview with Ho Quang Nghia, supra note 85. 
89 SACENT staff offered an example of a 2000 case. The case was brought by two parties 
to a construction contract. The plaintiff owner of the home made nearly 100% payment to the 
builder, but the defendant builder had failed to make any progress on construction of the home. At 
arbitration, both sides· agreed to a voluntary settlement in which the plaintiff would make certain 
further payments and the builder would complete construction of the home. After the resolution, 
the builder failed to make any progress on building the home and the plaintiff owner failed to make 
any further payments. This case has moved into the court system where it will be tried again. 
Interview with SACENT staff, supra note 82. 
90 Interview with Ho Quang Nghia, supra note 85. 
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Given its lack of effectiveness, to no one's surprise, relatively few 
cases end up at Arbitration Centers for resolution. In the words of an 
arbitration judge, they are often seen as an "unnecessary extra step" in the 
process of resolving commercial disputes.91 The Saigon Arbitration 
Center (SACENT), one of two arbitration centers in Ho Chi Minh City, 
handles only 5 cases annually. During the period, 1993-1999, the VIAC, 
with centers in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City handled only 99 cases - or 8 
cases per center per year. Ultimately, one third of these cases brought to 
the VIAC during the period 1993-1999 ended up being challenged further 
in the courts" with the courts routinely refusing to hear any ofthem. 
These structural defects make the arbitration process in Vietnam 
unattractive to businesses looking for non-judicial ways to settle disputes. 
As a result, arbitrators have developed a different understanding of their 
own job. Rather than make rulings on the facts and the law, arbitration 
judges make no effort to mask that they are undertaking mediation 
exercises. The inability of the arbitration to result in effective decisions 
means that for the center to become a relevant part of the resolution of 
commercial disputes, they must be able to fashion effective, voluntary 
settlemeuts betweeu parties. 
Curiously, the defects associated with the Arbitration Centers are 
common knowledge throughout the system, as the possible remedies that 
might be taken to improve the workings of the centers. Nevertheless, the 
defects persist with little sign that the National Assembly or Government 
will take the steps necessary to address them. 
91 Id 
92 Vu Thuy Huong, Legislative Prejudice Hampers Arbitration Process, VIETNAM 
iNVES!MENT REVIEW, Feb. 14, 2000 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reL Aug. 2001), 
Arbitration Forum to Resolve Civil Disputes, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, Aug. 31, 1998 
(Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
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E. Local Mediation and Conciliation Bodies 
Throughout Vietnamese legal literature there is an emphasis on 
mediation and conciliation of disputes." In recognition of the role that 
local bodies play in resolving disputes, Vietnam has a quasi-fonnal 
system of local mediation of disputes." The mediation system is 'fonnal' 
in that its role is recognized as important in the day-to-day maintenance 
of order and the resolution of disputes. It is 'quasi' in that its fonn and 
function are extremely flexible, depending on location and circumstances 
of the dispute. There is no particular fonn required for the mediation of 
disputes. 
Mediation and conciliation is generally limited to minor family 
matters, personal disagreements, minor commercial disputes, and minor 
administrative matters that can be resolved through issuance of a fme. 
'Serious' criminal offenses, serious violations of national law, matters 
involving land disputes, are specifically not to be resolved through a 
mediation or conciliation process." In practice, however, at the local 
level mediators resolve issues well beyond their portfolio, including 
minor land disputes" and labor disputes. 97 
Mediation boards are typically made up of members of the 
neighborhood councils (to dan pho), police, district or village People's 
Committees and the local representatives of the Fatherland Front. As 
representatives of the state, and also as known local leaders, local 
mediation boards are often best suited to resolve disputes between parties. 
Depending on the circumstances, a dispute can be mediated and a 
resolution reached verbally, or there can be a more foimal hearing of both 
sides with a written resolution accepted by both sides." It is, in one fonn, 
93 See Lua! To Chuc TOG An Nhan Dan [Law on the Organization of the People's Courts], 
No. 02UCTN, ch. 1, art. 2.2 (Oct. 10, 1992); Phap Lenh Ve To Chuc va Hoat Dong Hoa Giai a Co 
So [Ordinance on the Establishment and Operation of Mediation at the Unit Level}, No. 01 vern 
(Jan. 1, 1999). 
94 Phap Lenh Ve To Chuc va Hoat Dong HOG Giai 0 Co So [Ordinance on the Organization 
and qqeration of Mediation}, No. 01 UCTN (Jan. 1, 1999). 
Jd, ch. 1, art. 3. 
96 To Chuc Tot Viec HOG Giai [Good Organization of Mediation] (Ho Chi Minh Television, 
July 22, 2001). 
97 In the case of labor disputes, the Vietnam Confederation of Labor takes upon itself the 
role of labor mediator in labor disputes between management and labor unions. See Tran Thi Sanh) 
Trade Unions: A New Role in Vietnam) VIE1NAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, Aug. 16) 1993 (Vietnam 
Investment Database CDMROM, reI. Aug. 2001); Nguyen Tan Hai, Settlement of Labor Disputes, 
VIElNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, Sept. 19, 1994 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. 
Aug. 2001). 
98 Phap Lenh Ve To Chuc va Hoat Dong Hoa Giai 0 Co So [Ordinance on the Organization 
and Operation of Mediation}, No. 01 UCTN, ch. 3, art. 13 (Jan. 1, 1999). 
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the ultimate codification of the Vietnamese 'expres~~ 
stops at the village gate" (phep vua thuale1arig) .• <,.",,', ""'" 
More often than not the process is as a simple as 
market disputing the price or quality of a particular',prodtict 
mediator, usually known to both sides listens to the argtirilentarid';j£, 
suggests an outcome that might be equitable. A very COlllIilon alterna:fe 
scenario involves the police. At the scene of a motor accident, the police 
will often observe both parties and then suggest a distribution of costS 
rather than write up traffic tickets and officially document the accident. 
At the extreme, the police have been known to use their mediating role in 
criminal offenses. 
ill the case of deaths the result of seemingly negligent behavior, 
often related to traffic accidents, the police are known to broker 
compensation payments between relatives of the deceased and the party 
charged. ill exchange, the criminal charges against the negligent party are 
not sought." 
III. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Vietnam, like other formerly-centrally planned economies, has a 
bureaucratic system that encompasses a series of vertical and horizontal 
reporting relationships. . These overlapping reporting relationships, in 
theory, allow for the establishment of a single civil service staffed locally, 
but responsible to the center. The series of vertical, reporting 
relationships were intended to help instill uniformity and more effectively 
implement the central plan. ill fact, rather than a national civil service 
with the central government reaching vertically down to the lowest levels, 
what has developed instead are a series of strong provincial governments 
that compete with the central government for political power. 
Civil servants are ahnost exclusively hired locally. Transfers of 
personnel from one province to another are ahnost non-existent and 
transfers vertically from provincial governments to the central 
government occur only at the policy leveL 100 The result is that in the 
Vietnamese bureaucratic structure, provincial governments have 
99 The Year 2000 report to the National Assembly by the Chief Judge of the Supreme 
People's Court lauds the role of the police in mediating and finding some resolution to criminal 
activity without going to court through education, restitution, and confessions. For example, in 
2000 the police reported uncovering 5,110 smuggling cases. Through mediation and other means, 
they were able to reduce the number of cases going to court to only 103. See Report at the Eighth 
Meeti'/l' supra note 29, at 8-1l. 
I There is a conscious effort to select candidates for the positions of Vice Minister and 
above, from all three of Vietnam's major regions. The central government civil service tends to be 
dominated by people from the Hanoi area. 
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considerable influence over the implementation of legal and economic 
reforms and considerable latitude in the interpretation of government 
policy. 
The important role of the local government authorities in 
personnel and budgetary matters as they relate to the Provincial People's 
Courts and the Provincial State Prosecutors effectively eliminates any 
notion of independence by these bodies. This will be particularly true 
when there is a dispute that might involve a local state-owned enterprise. 
Prior to the economic reform, the bureaucracy itself was the 
primary means for the resolution of most disputes. Particular types of 
cases, for example criminal cases, were settled through the courts. But 
for the vast majority of civil and commercial disputes local bureaucratic 
structures like the mediation councils or direct appeal to line departments 
in the government was the only recognized avenue to resolve disputes. 
These bureaucratic avenues also had a nearly unending series of possible 
appeals - to higher levels in the bureaucracy or to other parts of the 
bureaucracy at the same level. 
Local policemen and neighborhood councils (to dan pho) held, 
and in many cases still hold, the authority to resolve disputes between 
neighbors and over minor land matters. In the alternative, parties to a 
dispute can petition relevant government departments at the local or 
provincial levels for assistance in mediating a resolution to a dispute. 
Parties to the dispute can, and often do, simultaneously petition a variety 
of potentially friendly departments in order to seek a favorable resolution 
to a dispute. These petitions can cascade until a relatively minor dispute 
is pushed to the highest levels of the bureaucracy. While this is 
occurring, of course, parties are still free to pursue their dispute through 
the courts. Figure 3 offers a stylized description of the potential avenues 
for dispute resolution. This figure is quite simple; in reality the number 
of potential combinations for working oneself through the bureaucracy 
can be quite large. 
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, I',') 
Before economic reform, commercial disputes involving a state " ,::'j 
enterprise and the five-year plan would be resolved by the Economic 
Arbitration Centers, According to Gillespie, the Arbitration Centers 
handled 3,000 cases in its last year. 101 Following the beginning of 
economic reform, the Economic Arbitration Centers were no longer 
adequate to serve the function of resolution of commercial disputes. It 
was an institution designed to mediate between enterprises in order to 
assure the fulfilhnent of the central plan. Without the central plan left to 
act as a guide, the Economic Arbitration Centers seemed to be unable to 
play an equivalent role in multi-sectored market economy. As a result, 
they were abandoned in 1992 when, following amendments to the 
Constitution, the courts were reorganized.IO> 
While there has been significant growth in the usage of the courts 
since the early 1990's, the number of commercial disputes seems not to 
have risen to levels that reflect the last years of the Economic Arbitration 
Centers with only over 1,000 cases heard in the economic courts in 2000. 
Rather than move into the courts, it seems clear that some portion of 
commercial disputes have moved into the informal sector. 
With the growth of the market economy, reinforced by 
institutional frameworks that pull power away from the courts, the natural 
tendency to seek negotiated or mediated settlements has strengthened. 
Though there has been a doubling in the demand for civil actions in the 
courts, it seems that a relatively large number of potential commercial 
disputes have 'disappeared' in the transition to the market. The 
'disappearance' of the vast majority of commercial disputes raises 
questions about how and under what circumstances these potential 
disputes are ultimately resolved. 
The balance of this paper will examine the interaction between the 
formal system, the bureaucracy and the informal sector in an attempt to 
illustrate the way civil and commercial disputes are resolved. It appears 
that in particular types of disputes (though involving state enterprises and 
property, that parties will turn to the bureaucratic structures to resolve 
disputes as much as they will the courts. For the most part, the 
bureaucracies are willing to attempt to resolve disputes brought to them 
rather than refer them to the courts. What follows is a description of three 
important types of disputes common in Vietnam today. While they do 
not represent the entire universe of disputes they are indicative of how the 
101 John Gillespie. Insolvency Law in Vietnam, in INSOLVENCY LAW IN ASIA 12 (Roman 
Tomasic, ed., 2000). 
102 Nguyen, supra Table 1 note a, at 8-9. 
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formal and informal systems tend to deal with some of the more 
important areas of disputes. These areas of concern are: administrative 
suits and complaints against government officials, resolution of property 
disputes and finally the resolution of commercial disputes. 
A. Administrative Suits 
Though administrative suits still make up a tiny fraction of the 
court activity, administrative suits and their complement - complaints and 
denunciations against officials - are rapidly growing in importance. 
When taken together, the creation of the Administrative Courts in 1995, 
along with the 1998 Law on Complaints and Denunciations and the 1998 
Amended Ordinance on Procedures for Resolving Administrative Cases, 
are potentially very important milestones' in the transition process. In 
theory, these laws and institutions create a set of tools that can be used by 
individuals to restrain the arbitrary power of the state: Though the reality 
of this goal is still long off, the area deserves attention. 
, The Vietnamese Constitution established the right, indeed the 
obligation, of citizens to report improper conduct by officials. lOl Peasants 
in Vietnam have long made a habit of walking in from the countryside to 
vent their grievances directly with the highest leadership of the country, 
by the mid-1990's it was not uncommon to see peasants knocking on the 
doors of the residences of the Prime Minister or General Secretary in an 
attempt to get them to personally intervene in their dispute with local 
officials. I04 Larger demonstrations of peasants in the main cities are not 
unknown. Illustrative was the live-in demonstration by peasant farmers 
in front of the Prime Minister's Ho Chi Minh City office in 2000.105 Of 
greater concern ·to the government and the Party are the types of more 
violent demonstrations against government abuse that sporadically occur 
$"oughout the countryside. The peasant uprising in Thai Binh is 
103 Bien Phap Nuoe Cong Hoa Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Vietnam 1992 [Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic a/Vietnam 1992J, No. 68 LCTIHDNN8, ch. 5, art. 74 (Apr. 18, 1992). 
104 Unlike in China, high-level cadres are not assigned special quarters and their addresses 
and home telephone numbers are routinely published in the white pages of the telephone book. The 
Prime Minister claimed to be receiving 1.5' kg of complaint mail at his home everyday. See Ha 
Thang, Deputies Demand New Voice Under New Complaints Bill, VIE1NAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, 
May 4, 1998 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
105 Nearly 300 peasant fanners with land complaints camped in the street in downtown Ho 
Chi Minh City from May 2000 until November 2000. Protestors set up a semi-pennanent camp and 
were well ensconced. Police initially made no active effort to eject the protesters. It is likely that 
this demonstration would have persisted much longer had US President Clinton not visited Ho Chi 
Minh City in late November 2000. Just hours prior to his arrival in the city, police and security 
forces peacefully removed the protestors. 
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probably the best known of these. 106 But there have been others in Dong 
Anh (Hanoi)101, Dong NaP" and more recently in the central highland 
provinces of Dak Lak and Gia Lai. 109 The common theme throughout all 
of these demonstrations was the consistent complaint against the arbitrary 
and improper use of state power at the local level to dispossess peasants 
of their land. Land and land ownership is a critically important issue. 
According to official sources, some 50% of the complaints and 
denunciations received from citizens from 1994 to 1999 were related to 
land matters. IIO Government and Communist Party responses to these 
types of disputes tend to walk a fine line. On the one hand, they 
recognize the serious nature of the complaints. On the other, they are 
limited by the power of provincial administrations with regard to local 
affairs. Whil~ the central government can persuade and cajole, it often 
finds it difficult to do more than that when a provincial government is 
unwilling to cooperate. 
In 1991, the government created a complaint procedure to 
complement the Constitutional right to complain. The 1991 Law on 
Complaints and Denunciations was intended to provide citizens with an 
avenue for seeking administrative appeals internally. It was formalistic 
and created a number of loopholes for local officials to suppress and 
dismiss complaints from the public. In practice, the 1991 Complaints 
Law was routinely ignored. Protests in Thai Binh, Dong Anh and Dong 
Nai gave impetus to a rewriting of the 1991 law. The 1998 Law on 
Complaints and Denunciations replaced the previous version of the law. II I 
106 This dispute is well documented internationally. Land clearance, land compensation and 
the corruption of local officials were amongst a number of issues that local people raised against 
county and provincial level governments. See Tran Manh .Hung, Bitter Harvest for Farmers, 
VIE1NAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, Dec. 29, 1997 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 
2001); Politburo Acts to Safeguard Right oj Rural Communities, VIE;1NAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, 
Mar. 9, 1998 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
107 In this case, villagers refused to accept a local government decision to eject the entire 
population of the village from their land in favor of a foreign-invested company building a golf 
course. A riot ensued and at least one person was killed by security forces. See Turf Battle Rages 
Over Golf, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, Dec. 9, 1996 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-
ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
108 In this case, protests erupted along Highway 1 after local government officials decided to 
convert a number of closed-churches to markets. The churches had been occupied by squatters who 
demanded compensation. In the end, the churches were returned to religious authorities after 
negotiation between protestors and representatives from the central government. 
109 Here, competition between upland minority people and lowland migrants over land led to 
unrest. The minority people claimed that the local governments had been complicit in allowing 
low-land migrants to occupy minority land. See Government Consolidates Control in Central 
Highlands, NIlAN DAN, July 24, 2001, at I. 
110 Nguyen Hanh, Land Certification 'Badly Bogged Down', VIETNAM INVESTMENT 
REVIEW, Apr. 19, 1999 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 200 I). 
111 Luat Khieu Nai, To Cao [Law on Complaints and Denunciations}, No. 0911998/QHIO 
(Dec. 2, 1998). 
r 
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At approximately the same time as there was· movementtoipreate 
a legal basis for complaints against government officials, the National 
Assembly made a number of reforms in the court system that rriight 
accommodate complaints against government officials acting in violation 
of the law, In 1995, the Law on the Organization of the Courts was 
amended to add an administrative court to the court system. l12 This new 
court would hear for the first time suits filed by individuals and 
enterprises against official government agencies. Prior to that time, any 
enterprise or individual who felt that administrative bodies had abused 
their positions of authority causing damage could only be dealt with 
through the administrative complaint procedures established by the 1991 
Law on Complaints and Denunciations. 
The courts, similar to Administrative Litigation in Chinall3, are 
intended to allow citizens to sue govemment offices when they feel that 
government officials have overstepped their authority in a number of 
areas, including housing and construction disputes, illegal arrest and 
detention, illegal layoffs, issuance of licenses, illegal confiscation of real 
estate, illegal assessment of taxes and fees, regarding housing, land use 
and the assessment of taxes. '" 
While on its face it seems to create ample opportunity for citizens 
to use the courts to restrain arbitrary government activity, there remain 
significant filing obstacles that have effectively kept this avenue for 
redress closed. Most significant are the inconsistencies between the 
Ordinance on the Procedures for Resolving Administrative Disputes ll5 
and the Law on Complaints and Denunciations. Judges not inclined to 
hear administrative cases can, using the inconsistencies between the laws 
refuse to hear cases. For example, the Law on Complaints requires that a 
citizen pursue all complaints about government action internally within 
the administrative bureaucracy and not within the courts. The Amended 
Ordinance on Procedures for Resolving Administrative Disputes, on the 
other hand, allows cases to enter the courts without having exhausted all 
internal appeals. So long as there is still a possible avenue of internal 
112 Sua Doi, Bo Sung Mot So Dieu cua Lua! To Chuc Toa An Nhan Dan [Amendments to the 
Law on the Organization of the People's Courts}, No. 43 vern, art 1, § 3 (Nov. 9, 1995). . 
113 The Chinese Administrative Litigation Law was the model adopted for the Vietnamese 
Administrative Courts. See Uong Chu LUll, Procedures for Reviewing Administrative Decisions -
Administrative Jurisdiction in Vietnam 11 (1996) (unpublished Research Paper No.6, on file with 
Australian International Legal Cooperation Program, Attorney General's Office). For more on the 
Administrative Litigation Law in China, see generally Susan Finder, Like Throwing An Egg Against 
A Stone? Administrative Litigation In The People's Republic O/China, 3 COLUMBIA J CHINESE L 
1,1989. 
114 Phap Lenh Thu Tuc Giai Quyet Cac Vu An Hanh Chinh [Ordinance on the Procedures 
for Resolving Administrative Disputes}, No, 49 vern, ch, 2, art 11 (June 3, 1996), 
115 ld. 
:!:Ii 
l'j!'I' 
"I 
',i! 
I:' 
Ii 
""1"1 
" 
-". 
, 
262 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LA W [15:2 
appeal, and there are many, there exists sufficient cause for reluctant 
judges to dismiss complaints. "' These internal inconsistencies within the 
law make it difficult for parties to pursue an administrative case against 
government officials. 
The relatively small number of cases accepted for trial relative to 
the number of complaints the courts report as having received shows that 
barriers to entry in the administrative courts remain a major problem. 
First and foremost, the court defines its jurisdiction very narrowly 
refusing to accept cases that lie outside its scope.ll7 
116 Phap Lenh Sua Doi, Bo Sung Mot So Dieu Cuo Phap Lenh Thu Tuc Giai Quyet Cae Vu 
An Hanh Chinh [Amended Ordinance on the Procedures for Resolving Administrative Disputes], 
No. 0I!L-CTN, ch. 1, art. 1 (Jan. 5, 1999); Luat Khieu Nai. To Coo [Law on Complaints and 
Denunciations}. Dec. 2, 1998, ch. 2, No.0911998/QHlO. Chapter Two of the Law on Complaints 
outlines the variety of bodies that are empowered to hear and resolve complaints. Notably, Chapter 
Two does not include the courts. 
Il1 Interview with Phan Tanh, supra note 26. 
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Under the ordinance, citizens have the right to sue public officials 
for illegal acts committed under the color oflaw.1l8 Citizens cannot sue if 
a public official acts within his discretion. This has limited the 
eff'ectivenessof the courts as, for example, the issuance of business 
licenses was at that point discretionary.l19 Additionally, in order for a suit 
to be filed, the state agency must have issued a written order. Official 
inaction or verbal instructions by government officials are not a sufficient 
basis for the administrative court to establish jurisdiction. Needless to 
say, narrow drawing of jurisdiction creates a number of large loopholes 
by which local administrations can avoid the administrative courts 
altogether.'" This is not just theory, in the first three days of the 
administrative court's operation in Ho Chi Minh City, there were twenty-
five suits filed with the court. The court refused to hear any of the cases 
stating that the cases did not meet the criteria established for a hearing. l2I 
One of the important criteria initially required that individuals 
exhaust all direct appeals to the administrative body responsible for the 
initial decision."2 The process could be easily thwarted by an 
uncooperative state agency. For example, state agencies are required to 
respond in writing to complaints. A suit cannot be brought against a state 
agency that has not responded in writing to a complaint. The court's own 
procedures prevented it from hearing complaints where the state agency 
has essentially ignored the complaint being brought. This inconsistency 
was resolved in 1998 when the Amended Ordinance on Procedures for 
Resolving Administrative Suits went into effect, allowing for certain kinds 
of cases to be resolved directly by the courts. Under the present 
procedures, a suit may be filed if the relevant agency does not respond in 
writing within thirty days of a complaint having been filed.123 However, it 
is still not clear which of the Amended Ordinance on Procedures for 
118 Phap Lenh Thu Tuc Giai Quyet Cae Vu An Hanh Chinh [Ordinance on the Procedures 
for Resolving Administrative Disputes], No. 49 VeTN, ch. 1, art, 2 (June 3, 1996). . 
l19 This was later changed by the 1998 Enterprise Law which made the issuance of a 
business license automatic upon completion of registration documents. 
120 Court Gives Forumjor Public Complaint, VIE1NAM INvESTMENT REvIEW, July 16,1996 
(Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, rel. Aug. 2001). 
121 Id 
\22 Phap Lenh Thu Tuc Giai Quyet Cae Vu An Hanh Chinh [Ordinance on the Procedures 
for ResolVing Administrative Disputes], No. 49 LlCTN, ch. 1, art. 2 (June 3, 1996). 
123 Phap Lenh Sua Dol: Bo Sung MJJst So Dieu Phap Lenh Thu Tue Giai Quyet Vu An Hanh 
Chinh [Amended Ordinance on Procedures/or Resolving Administrative Suits], No. Ol-LlClN, ch. 
1, art. 2 (Jan. 5, 1999). 
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Resolving Administrative Suits or the Law on .Comp~aints"afzCl·· 
Denunciations take precedence.124 ' 
Less high profile cases, like those registered by the Hue People's 
Court show that the backlog for administrative cases is much higher than 
for any other types of cases (only one third of the administrative cases 
received were categorized as completed, versus more than 50% of all 
other cases). The overall number of administrative cases remains very 
small, however (less than 1.5 percent of cases accepted by the Hue court). 
Nationally, the figures are similar. Eighty-four percent (1999) and 86% 
(2000) of all cases accepted into the system were resolved within the 
year. However, administrative cases were dealt with more slowly, with 
only 64% (1999) and 74% (2000) of administrative cases resolved within 
a year of being filed. At the same time, administrative cases make up a 
very small percentage of the cases in the system, less than I % of all cases. 
Given the large number of complaints sent to high officials, the 
low number of suits accepted for a hearing raises questions.t" The 
Supreme People's Court in Hanoi recognized a possible weakness in the 
system when it noted the reluctance. of enterprises to bring suits against 
state bodies, rather seeking to preserve relationships and negotiate 
resolutions. 126 There is also recognition that, at least at the lower levels, 
the relationship between the administrative courts and the local 
governments makes it difficult to always expect an unbiased outcome in 
administrative suits. l27 
The structure of the complaint process leads to a series of 
potential conflicts of interest and slow-downs in the resolution of 
complaints. Having the local authority responsible for making the 
decision also act as arbitrator of the complaint process can sometimes 
lead to the suppression of positive outcomes for complainants. A high 
profile case is now being brought by a private businessman in Hanoi who 
is seeking compensation from local authorities because they expropriated 
. his jmsiness in the mid-eighties. In this case, the businessman 
complained to the authorities for 17 years before receiving high-level 
intervention in the form of a resolution from the Prime Minister's Office 
that he be compensated for the losses associated with the expropriation. 
124 Tran Vu Hoi, Cai Gach He Thong TOG An Hanh Chinh {Reform the Administrative Court 
!iYstemj, TBKT SAIGON, July 26, 2001, at 44. 
1 According to official sources, the Prime Minister receives 1.5 kg of complaint mail at his 
home everyday. See Ha Thang, Deputies Demand New Voice Under New Complaints Bill, 
VIE'INAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, May 4, 1998 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 
2001). 
126 Courts Seek Greater Powers, VIETNAM INvESTMENT REVIEW, May 28, 2001 (Vietnam 
InvestmentDatabase CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
127 Tmn, supra note 124, at 44. 
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The local government officials in Hanoi refused to comply with the Prime 
Minister's resolution. In July 2001, the administrative court in Hanoi 
agreed to accept the suit.128 
In the 1998 Law on Complaints, a path for appeals of local 
administrative decisions is laid out,'29 at the same time it is contradictory 
in that there is also a requirement in the law that complainants accept the 
findings of the relevant body without appeal,130 
The Administrative Suits Ordinance carves out an odd exception. 
Upon resolution of any case, should the Prime Minister feel that the court 
has acted 'incorrectly,' he may request that the Prosecutor's Office and 
the Court to review the decision again and effectively overturn the 
decision. '31 Nowhere else in Vietnamese law can the Prime Minister 
officially intervene to overturn a court decision. Given the structure of 
the Party's control over the courts, it seems odd that law makers would 
even bother to create such an obvious exception that has the potential of 
causing conflict between the various anns of government. As of this 
date, this public policy exception has not been used. 
Clearly, the rise of corruption lowers public confidence in 
confidence in public institutions. Increasing transparency of public 
decision making and reducing bureaucratic discretion may help reduce the 
level of corruption. The work of the administrative courts and the 
impact, if any, of the Law on Denunciations and Complaints'" will be 
important in ultimately resolving issues of corruption and public 
administration reform. However, there is still a hesitancy on the part of 
the courts and the bureaucracy to accept many cases. As a result, the 
bureaucracy itself handles the vast majority of cases of official 
misconduct internally. 
B. Property Disputes 
Property disputes are probably, after family matters, the single 
most common form of dispute in Vietnam. The Court reports that the 
majority of the approximately 45,000 civil disputes brought to the court in 
2000 were property related. Indeed, many of the family matters at the 
128 HanoiPeople's Committee Sued, PHUNuTP HeM, July 14, 2001, at 1. 
129 Luat Khieu Na;, To Cao [Law on Complaints and Denunciations}. No. 09/1998/QHlO, 
ch. 1, art. 39 (Dec. 2, 1998). 
130 Id, ch. 1, art. 8. 
I31 Phap Lenh Tim Tue Giai Quyet Cae Vu An Hanh Chinh [Ordinance on the Procedures 
for Resolving Administrative Disputes}, No. 49 vern, ch. 1, art. 8 (June 3, 1996). 
132 Lua! Khieu Nai, To Cao [Law on Complaints and Denunciations], No. 0911998/QHlO, 
ch. 1, art, 8 (Dec. 2, 1998). 
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court tend to revolve around property disputes.133 In 1998, the General 
Department of Land in Vietnam reported that 11 ,097 complaints about 
land disputes were reported to its office for resolution. I " According to the 
government, more than half of all citizen complaints have been related to 
land disputes. l3S In the period of transition, property rights are still 
sufficiently ambiguous as to engender significant confusion amongst 
parties that it is often not clear who owns whatand which rights are 
actually part of the ownership. More, often . disputes are between 
possessors of property and local governments and revolve around takings 
and issues of compensation. :, "\ 
During the height of Vietnam's centraLplannmg, all land 
belonged to the State and individual, ownership "of':property . was 
prohibited. During the period of central plannjng.followingthe end of the 
war in 1975, it was illegal to buy or sell landandpllt;allproperty.under 
the management of the State. In practice, urban:lfarrji1ie:sTbought 'and 
sought homes informally using handwritten lagre~melifs";(S4rig Jay) 
notarized or witnessed by local officials. l36 In. the:rur~late\ls;j;therewas 
significant regional variation in the interpretation;of<th~~~ti1~tur~f,against 
land sales. In northern provinces, where colleciiviZatfbh"'w!\,shstrongest, 
local officials were able to allocate and reallocate 1im:d:jtttliIt~iil:~l\ts'of,the 
collective on an annual basis. In the 
collectivization failed to take root, farmersterigep 
expectation of ownership of the land that theyw:o~k~d 
The 1993 Land Law and its 
established that land would be "owned by th{peoplej 
State" with the State granting long-temi userightsltg 
political organizations, families, and 
farmers were granted long-term use rightsof'betj.~ 
depending on the particular crop, with the righUo .. 1 
that term. l39 Land used for residential housmgis 
133 Report at the Eighth Meeting, supra note 29, 'at 14. ;, 
134 Complaints and Denunciations Overload Cadasft:al 
1998. at I. ' . 
135 Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Cong Tan referring'··tO<di 
over an unspecified period related· to land clearance < • 
Land Compensation Policy, THANH NIEN, Dec. 15,2000, at 1, •. , . '.' i ;~ 
136 While these types of transactions are expressly -foroi4ilijl 
continue nevertheless. See Lua! Dat Dat [Land Law}, No. 24 UerN; 
137 For a general discussion on collectivization, see 
POLICY SINCE 1975 (1992). 
138 Luat Sua Dot, Bo Sung Mot So Dieu Cua Luat 
the Land Law], No. 1O/1998/QHIO, art. 1, § 1 (Dec. 2. ,1998) .. """ 
139 Land used for perennial crops and fisheries is ·limite~.t. 
used for long growing tree crops is limited to 50 years. The·.exte!;iS 
upon the leaseholder having used the land "in accordance with t 
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structure on a 'Iong-tenn' basis, and is effectively pennanent. I40 . Land 
used for commercial purposes can be rented from the government for a 
period of up to 20 years.I'I Leaseholders are also granted the right to 
transfer, sell, rent, or mortgage the property under their control. 
State enterprises have an odd exception to this provision. In the 
case of bankruptcy or closure of the enterprise, its land must be returned 
to the state's management. I" Effectively, state-owned land cannot be the 
subject of foreclosure by a banle They are allowed to mortgage state 
owned assets under their control only with the approval of the People's 
Committee or relevant government ministry. I" In case of foreclosure, a 
bank can only take possession of the assets of a state-owned enterprise 
following a process called phat mai by which the local People's 
Committee or relevant agency agrees to grant the land to the fmancial 
institution for the purposes of resolving the debt of a state-owned 
enterprise. This process is a discretionary process on the part of the local 
government; they are not required to give up state owned land to financial 
institutions. In practice, state enterprises rarely seek permission to 
mortgage land; banks accept mortgaged state property on the assumption 
that, should the enterprise default, the local government will allow the 
bank to take the land. 144 
Ambiguities relating to property title can make it difficult for 
entrepreneurs to mortgage assets and get credit to build up businesses. 
There are, however, a number of issues that can stand as obstacles. Under 
central planning, title to property was not important; land was assigned 
and reassigned by local authorities on a regnlar basis. Throughout the 
South where landowners had already established rights to land, these 
rights were, in theory, abolished. Following the shift to the market 
economy, establishing clearer rights to land and property became more 
important. 
According to the 1993 law and its regnlations, land use rights over 
particular piece of property can be established through documentation 
that essentially shows that the leaseholder has been in uncontested 
140 Id, art. 1, § 4. 
141 John Gillespie, Land Law Subsystems? Urban Vietnam as a Case Study, 7 PAC. RIM L. 
& POL'y J 555, 571 (1998). 
I" Luat Dat Dai [Land Law], No. 24 UCTN, ch. 2, art. 26 (July 24,1993). 
143 Luat Doanh Nghiep Nha Nuoe [Law on State Enterprises], No. 39 uern, ch. 2, art. 6 
(Apr. 20, 1995). 
144 This puts banks in a tenuous position with regard to the value of collateral. Followingtbe 
collapse of a state-owned enterprise in 1997 (Minh Phung/EPCO), local governments refused to 
allow banks holding property under mortgage to foreclose on the properties; instead the banks must 
return the property to state management. 
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possession for a specified period of years. This can be done through the 
use of at least one of the following documents. 
I) Title documents (previous regime); 
2) Sales document approved by local government; 
3) Land rental agreement (previous or current regime); 
4) Copy ofland registration book (previous regime) 
5) Letter from local government establishing long-term 
residency.'45 
The power of local officials to accept these documents, though, is 
written in such a way as to provide maximum discretion to local officials. 
On the one hand, it might be extremely difficult to provide any . of the 
documents required to establish property rights - a documenLfrom the 
previous regime in the South or the colonial regime in the 'North, for 
example. On the other hand, should local officials be cooperative;. the 
entire process can be quite simple - a letter from the lodlFPeople's 
Committee and local Fatherland Front establishing that 'one,haS',b~en 
resident and theland not claimed by others. '46 . . :;U' 
Clear title, alone, is not sufficient condition. When c~ear,titleiis 
accompanied by burdensome or opaque land-use regulation, ,the::yahi6,of 
the title may be severely degraded. Vague use regulations are:c({rilJ11ondn 
Vietnam - particularly in the rural areas where farmers w;th'titl;";;;i'.~ 
seek permission from local authorities before converting 
grow rice to an alternative use. '" The discretionary, and ottel!,ar!J~1 
application of these regulations leaves title-holders subject 
random land-use regulation by a host of overlappingadm:!!)1s 
bodies. This confusion over land-use planning results 
higher transaction costs associated with converting useof,:i1arr.U;~.f!;1 
agricultural to industrial uses. 
For most transactions, an informal sale and purchasei1 
'sang fay' process was sufficient. Small-scale private firm's:'~) 
result of government policy and partly a result of inadequate 
rarely rely on banks for fmancing. As the economy and 
develop, informal 'sang fay' sales may limit the _ 
private firms. As firms grow from family-owned and operat~q:t 
145 General Land Department, Gong Van 647/CV-DC Ve Viee huong Dan 
Hien Nghe Dinh So 60/CP [Document 647/CV-DC Regarding Guidelines on the 
Government Direction 601CP}, Part I, § 2 (May 31,1995). 
146 Id" Part I, §§ 1-3. 
147 Chi Thi So 247 IITg Cuo Thu Tuong Chinh Phu Ve Khac Phuc Tinh 
Tich Dat Trong Lua NUDe [Prime Minister's Directive 247/TI'g Regarding 
Problem of Lower Areas of Rice Cultivation}, No, 247mg (Apr, 28,1995), 
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to larger more formal corporate structures, their need for capital and space 
rises. 
Recent government policy has been to accede to reality. Where 
local governments can establish that particular parties have been in actual, 
uncontested possession of a particular piece of property for a prescribed 
amount of time, the governments are encouraged to accept possession as a 
proxy for ownership and a presumptive land-use right.I4' This has been an 
important step, but it does not resolve all of the issues that stand as 
obstacles. 
For many small businesses, the process of converting land from 
personal ownership to fIrm ownership can be onerous from a fInancial 
point of view. The legalization ofland title .requires land owners to pay a 
registration fee equal to 20% of the market value of the land, payable at 
the time of registration. I" If the land is used for residential purposes, then 
it is granted by the government at no cost. Land cannot be granted to a 
commercial enterprise, rather it must be rented from the state. I" Gillespie 
has noted that the difference in tenure associated with residential land and 
commercial also plays a role in the decision by businessmen to convert 
their property to commercial. l5l More importantly there seems to be a 
disincentive for family-owned fIrms to convert their assets from family 
held to corporate ownership, as the result would be to trade in effective 
long-term ownership for a renewable fIve-year leasehold. While rented 
land can be used as collateral,. collateral rules require that the lease be 
prepaid for at least fIve years in order for the land to be available as 
collateral. 152 Had the property not been converted, it might still be used 
for the same purpose, but lease payments to government would not have 
to be made. The result is that undercapitalized private fIrms are unable, 
or unwilling, to secure lending from banks because they do convert 
property from residential to commercial classifIcations in order to avoid 
having to pay lend rentals. Also, conflicting public policy aims also 
create incentives for bankers to be averse to making private sector 
loans. 153 
148 Though there are exceptions to this general rule that involve land belonging to State 
agencies or state enterprises lent to individuals and land belonging to Overseas Vietnamese. See 
Nghi Quyet SO 5811998INQ-UBTVQH10 Ve Giao Dich Dan Su Ve Nha 0 Duoc Xac Lap Truoc 
Ngay 1-7-1991 [Resolution No 58INQ-UBTVQHIO Regarding Civil Transactions for Houses 
Completed BeJoreJuly 1, 1991J, No. 58INQ-UBTVQH10, ch. 2, art. 5 (Aug. 20, 1998). 
149 Luat DatDai [Land LawJ, No. 24 LlCTN, ch. 2, art. 22a (July 24,1993). I" Id., ch. 2, art. 22b. 
151 Gillespie, supra note 141. 
IS2 Dong Phuong, Main Theme Still Implementation, VIE1NAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, June 
18,2001 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
153 For example, left over from the 1980 Constitution which guaranteed every citizen with a 
right to housing is the accepted practice in Vietnam that one cannot take an action that results in 
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Getting access to new land by private fInns can also be an 
obstacle. Rather than buy land from existing owners, a fInn looking for a 
greenfIeld site will typically have to submit request to the local 
government for allocation of a piece of land. Allocation of the land is at 
the discretion of the local government. Where the local government has a 
competing state enterprise, it is not uncommon to hear of successful 
private businesses denied access to new land. 
Box 1: Squatters 
Squatters present a similar, but yet more complicated challenge to 
the management of property disputes. Squatter families also adopted the 
strategy of buying and selling land through handwritten agreements (sang 
tay) notarized or witnessed by local officials, with fInes and bribes issued 
by local officials treated as licenses to use the land. 
It is not uncommon to fInd squatter communities supported by 
local government services and develop familiar governmental 
structnres.154 For local officials who have developed relationships among 
the them it becomes extremely difficult to attempt to evict squatters. 
Implementing regulations for land registration are full of exceptions for 
people who 'have a true need' for land, establishing great latitude for 
discretion by local officials in making that detennination.155 
In many cases, urban squatters are also drawn from the corps of 
cadres and 'policy families', making their eviction more difficult in the 
face ofless onerous alternatives. In a recent case, a squatter community in 
Hanoi has been threatened with eviction without much success. Of the 
another_becoming homeless. This has caused difficulties as bankers fmd it difficult to foreclose and 
evict, if the eviction results in a person becoming homeless. While not explicitly stated, the 
Ordinance on the Enforcement of Civil Judgments can be read to include a prohibition against 
taking one's home in the enforcement of a judgement.' See Phap Lenh Thi Hanh An Dan Su 
[Ordinance on Enforcement o/Civil Judgments], No. 13 LlCTN, ch. 4, art 30.1-2 (Apr. 26, 1994). 
As a result, there is a serious disincentive for bankers to foreclose on problem loans. Also, a series 
of lending scandals involving private companies that resulted in long prison sentences being handed 
to down to bankers, created an incentive not to undertake any unsecured lending activity 
(TAMEXCO case, EPCO case). The Law on State Enterprises makes it a criminal offense for a 
state-owned enterprise manager to take action that leads to "losses in assets of the enterprise." This 
creates a disincentive for bankers to make 'risky' loans. See Luat Doanh Nghiep Nha Nuoc [Law 
on State-Owned Enterprises], ch. 8, art. 56.3 (Apr. 20, 1995). 
IS4 For a detailed description of the process used by squatters, see Gillespie, supra note 141, 
at 591-592. 
ISS For an example of the wide discretion afforded to local officials, see Vietnamese General 
Land Department, Cong Van So 1427/CV-DC Ve Viec Huong Dan Xu Ly Mot So Van De Ve Dat 
Dai de Cap Giay Chung Nhan Quyen Su Dung Dat [Document 1427/CV-DC Regarding Guidelines 
to Resolve Some Problems in the Registration o/Land Use Certificates}, § 3 (Oct. 13, 1995). 
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125 families in this particular community, 49 families were govement 
cadres and 6 families were 'policy families.' 156 
The problem is made more complicated by the treatment in the 
Land Law of occupiers of land who do not have sufficient claim to the 
underlying land, but do have clear ownership of the home that sits on the 
land. Ownership of improvements on disputed land give the 
improvement owners access to the courts on the same basis as if they held 
the actual land-use right. 157 This creates a common situation where the 
land-use right belongs to one party, and the improvements belong to 
another. Courts and administrative agencies have, to date, not developed 
a consistent method of dealing with this problem. 
Property disputes are generally to be resolved by the local 
People's Committee. ISS According to the law, disputes regarding 'land 
use rights' are to be resolved first by conciliation between the parties.15' 
When conciliation fails, disputes can take two alternate paths: disputes 
involving parties without proper land use documentation are to be 
handled by the local People's Committee. I60 Disputes involving state 
administrative agencies and state enterprises are also to be handled by the 
local People's Committee and the administrative units concerned. I6l 
Private parties in dispute can only gain access to the courts ifboth 
sides have proper paperwork in order.162 In a country that has gone 
through war, revolution and land reform, the requirement for perfect title 
can be a substantial obstacle for possessors of land. Limiting access to 
the courts to only those with proper title would effectively eliminate most 
claims from the courts. In recognition of that reality, there is an 
'improvement' exception. I6l Where parties do not have proper paperwork 
on the land, but they have made significant improvements (house), then 
the law will grant them the option of accessing the courts as if they had 
156 Policy families are equivalent to Gold Star Mothers in the US. Families who have lost 
immediate members as a result of their service in the military are considered policy families singled 
out for special assistance by the state. See Giai Toa Cae Cong Trinh Lan Chiem Dat Cong Tai Ho 
Thuoc Tay [Clearing the Buildings Occupying Public Land Along the Thuoc Tay Lake}, PHAP 
LUAT, July 25, 2001, at 9. 
157 Luat Dot Dai [Land Law], ch. 2, art. 38.3, July 24, 1993, No. 24 L/CTN. 
IS8 People's Committee is the Vietnamese version of an American city/town council. 
159 Luat Dot Dai [Land Law], ch. 2, art. 38.1, July 24, 1993, No. 24 L/CTN. 
160 Jd, art 38.2. 
161 ld., art 39. 
162 Jd, art 38.3. 
163 Id 
"?":'-~ 
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proper title. The 'improvement' exception has been the subject of quite a 
bit of controversy as it essentially legalizes squatting.164 
Narrowing the access to the court system establishes that most 
disputes involving land are handled outside of the courts - either through 
informal mediation or through the bureaucracy. In the alternate, parties 
seek access to the courts, but on related matters, not land matters directly. 
The case of Mr. Phan Ngoc Khanh presents a familiar scenario. I " 
Mr. Khanh occupied 100,000 square meters of state-owned forest land in 
1993 to convert to fisheries. After occupying the land, Mr. Khanh 
petitioned and received from the local government permission to use the 
land he occupied for the purpose of raising shrimp and fish. Three years 
later, the local government reversed its opinion and fined Mr. Khanh for 
illegally occupying the land. It did not seek to eject him. In 1997, the 
provincial government announced its intention to use a large parcel of 
land, including the parcel still occupied by Mr. Khanh, to build a large 
port facility. In order to get access to the land, the provincial government 
offered Mr. Khanh compensation for his home, but not the land he 
occupied to raise fish. Mr. Khanh refused to accept the compensation and 
appealed the decision internally and then to the administrative courts. I " 
Mr. Khanh's case was ultimately rejected by the administrative courts and 
he was ordered to give up the property. The provincial government did 
not seek to eject Mr. Khanh, but has continued to negotiate with him. 
The case remains unresolved. 
As the legal basis for access to the courts for the resolution of 
property claims is still unclear, many of these .cases are resolved through 
the bureaucracy. Where they are admitted to the courts, they often enter 
as related claims. 
C. . Economic Disputes 
Prior to economic reform, the formal legal system was primarily 
concerned with issues of criminal law and national security. Economic 
164 The typical squatting scenario goes as follows: A newspaper announces that XYZ firm 
will develop a project in a particular area. Overnight people begin to move in and build homes. 
Months later when the fum shows up to begin construction of its investment project it discovers 
hundreds of people living on the site. These people must be compensated for their land or the 
dispute resolved in a court. Generally, developers will pay compensation. For examples, see 
Nguyen Ngoc Chinh, Compensation Furore Delays Roadway, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, 
Nov. 4, 1996 (Vietnam InvestmentDatabase CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
165 Chinh Quyen Cau Tha, Nguoi Dan Vo Loi [Government Forgives, The People Have No 
Sin}, DAUTU, July 24,,2001, at 6. 
166 It appears that the majority of the cases that the administrative courts hear are land-
related. The most recent docket available at the Ho Chi Minh City Administrative Court (Apr., 
2001) shows that nearly all of the 24 cases being heard that month were related to land matters. 
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disputes during the period of central planning, when they arose, typiciilly 
involved at least one state enterprise, and often, were disputes over the 
implementation of the economic plan. As a result, these disputes were 
naturally resolved within the bureaucratic planning structures and not in 
the courts. Under central planning economic arbitration bodies existed to 
serve state administration of contracts and resolving disputes between 
parties. At the time (prior to 1990), Economic Arbitration Centers had 
the right to conduct investigations of business records and contract 
implementation. 167 
When the Economic Arbitration Centers were finally phased out 
in 1993, they were replaced by the establishment of the Economic Courts 
within the court system as a specialized court at the provincial and central 
level. Economic Courts claim jurisdiction over the following types of 
disputes: I) contract disputes between legal persons; 2) disputes within 
enterprises and disputes in regard to the establishment, operation and 
dissolution of enterprises (including bankruptcy); and disputes related to 
the sale of stocks and bonds. IOS 
Disputes involving an individual not associated with the company 
are not heard in the Economic Courts, but in civil courts. With regard to 
jurisdiction, procedure requires that economic disputes are heard in the 
jurisdiction of the defendant, except in cases relating to real estate in 
which case the dispute is heard in the locale of real estate in question. I" 
Alternatively, if it is a contractual dispute, the case may be heard in the 
jurisdiction where the contract was to be carried OUt. I70 
A recent review of the docket of cases at Vietnam's largest 
Economic Court (Ho Chi Minh City) revealed that of the 28 cases 
scheduled for July, 2001, all but three involved exclusively private parties 
(including foreign invested enterprises). Two involved exclusively state 
enterprises and one involved a dispute between a state-owned firm and a 
private firm. Twenty of the cases schedule for the month of July listed a 
real estate related contractual dispute as the primary issue for the court's 
consideration, including sale, rental, and construction of real estate. The 
balances were listed disputes related to service or trading contracts. 
The 1,000 or so cases that make it to the economic courts do not 
likely represent the entirety of business disputes. Survey data from 
167 Economic Arbitration Boards under central planning are to be understood differently 
from arbitration as presently understood. They were quasi-legal bodies, replaced in 1994 by the 
Economic Courts. See Nguyen, supra Table 1 note a, at 10. 
168 Most cases heard in the Economic Courts are, in fact, contractual disputes between 
businesses. Phap Lenh Thu Tuc Giai Quyet Cae Vu An Kinh Te [Ordinance on the Procedures for 
Resolving Economic Disputes), No. 31 UCTN, ch. 2, art. 12 (Mar. 29, 1994). 
169 Id, ch. 2, art. 14. 
110 [d, ch. 2, art. 15. 
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McMillan and others indicate that most of the resolution of commercial 
disputes takes place outside the system. Indeed, Gillespie reports that in 
1993, the last full year of operation, the Economic Arbitration Centers 
handled more than 3,000 disputes between state-owned firms.17I 
There are still relatively few commercial disputes brought to the 
country's economic courts and fewer still cases brought to arbitration 
centers. On average about one thousand commercial disputes are brought 
to the courts every year and less than two dozen cases are brought to any 
one of Vietnam's four arbitration centers. Rather, the formal dispute 
resolution system puts an emphasis on settling disputes out of court.172 
Over and over again, a constant theme throughout Vietnamese legislation 
is the focus on mediation (hoa giai) of disputes. Approximately half of 
the 1,000 commercial disputes brought to the economic courts every year 
end in settlements before trial and the nature of the Economic Arbitration 
Centers (present) tends to ensure that parties work towards a mediated 
outcome. 
Rather than seeking the settlement of commercial disputes 
through the formal legal system, commercial disputes, particularly those 
involving state enterprises, are resolved in very different forums. More 
often than not, parties to commercial disputes may seek to access the 
bureaucracy in order to seek resolution in disputes. The case of the 
Luong Co Mining Company, a state-owned enterprise in southern Baria-
Vung Tau province is illustrative of the bureaucratic dispute resolution 
processes, as they exist.173 In that case, the state-owned mining company 
entered into a series of long term contracts with private companies 
whereby the private companies would undertake mining and 
transportation activities on behalf of Luong Co. 
171 Gillespie, supra note 101, at 12. 
m Phap Lenh Thu Tuc Giai Quyet Cae Vu An Kinh Te [Ordinance on the Procedures for 
Resolving Economic Disputes], ch. I, No. 31 vern, art. 5 andch. 7, art 36 (Mar. 29, 1994). 
173 This dispute was featured on the program: Cong 1Y Khoang San Luong Co Nen Co Phon 
Hoa [Luong Co Mining Company Should Eguitize] (VTVI, July 31, 2001). 
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After some years of operation, nearly all essential mmmg 
activities were undertaken by private companies working, under the 
contract. A series of disputes arose between Luong Co and its private 
contractors, leading to a unilateral cancellation of all work at the Luong 
Co mine. Rather than seeking redress from the courts for the breach of 
contract, the private contractors took their complaints, first to the local 
Department of Industry, and then to the People's Committee of Baria-
Vung Tau province. After some six months of negotiation with the 
People's Committee and the Department of Industry acting as mediator, 
the People's Committee issued a directive instructing Luong Co to 
undertake certain acts to resolve the dispute. 
Had the disputes gone to the courts, the local courts would have 
been unable to reach a decision contrary to the interests of the province 
without at least the acquiescence of the local government. Enforcement 
of any judgment against the company would have also required that the 
private parties seek the assistance of the local Department of Justice. 
Rather than expending time and energy moving through the courts, the 
private parties to the dispute negotiated directly with the Provincial 
People's Committee for a resolution. 
In business relationships with state-owned fums, the responsible 
government authority (co quan chu quan) in resolving disputes occupies a 
very important position. This- is particularly true at the provincial level 
where the provincial governments have authority not only over the 
operations of the state-owned firms, but also over the judicial apparatus 
and the police. As a result, at the first sign of a dispute, parties will often 
turn to responsible government authority in order to seek resolution 
through negotiation in a political, rather than judicial, setting. 
Box 2: Criminalization of Civil Disputes 
The phenomenon of 'criminalization' of civil and economic 
disputes is one that attracted the attention of local commentators in recent 
years. This phenomenon is may find its origins in the history of central 
planning and an anti-private sector ideology that was especially prevalent 
in the early days of reform and still lingers in many respects today. From 
an ideological perspective, the private sector was considered a class of 
'exploiters.' The private sector was also looked upon with suspicion as 
fraudsters and cheats. With the shift to the market economy, the courts at 
times take upon themselves the mission of protectiog parties in disputes 
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from the potentially nefarious conduct of private businessmen through 
criminal action. 
Judges in the civil and economic court reserve the right to call an 
inspector into any case. The inspector is usually drawn from the 
Prosecutor's Office and has the right to carry out an inspection and 
investigation into the economic dispute. Additionally, the Prosecutor's 
Office also reserves the right to participate in any economic dispute 
before the court - with or without the permission of the presidingjudge.174 
The threat of an independent inspector from the prosecutor's office poring 
through the books of a private company is probably sufficient to dissuade 
most parties from taking their disputes to a court unless absolutely 
necessary .175 
This has likely had an affect on bankruptcy proceedings where 
since the bankruptcy was passed in 1994, nationally only 64 companies 
had completed the bankruptcy procedures by May, 2000. At the same 
time, there were as many as 1,000 firms in Ho Chi Minh City, alone, that 
might qualify as technically bankrupt.176 The Supreme Court identifies 
the biggest obstacle to more aggressive use of bankruptcy proceedings as 
the inability of bankrupt firms to complete the paperwork required to 
file. 177 . 
Recent cases that illustrate the problems when the Prosecutor's 
Office becomes involved in civil disputes. There is, for example, the case 
of Ms. Ngo Thi Be Ba. Ms. Be Ba signed a contract with Mr. Nguyen 
Ton Van to sell her house. Mr. Van paid a deposit on the house. After 
the paperwork on the sale had been processed, Mr. Van announced that he 
would no longer purchase the property. Ms. Be Ba sued in the county 
court for specific performance of the contract and the buyer of the house 
counter-sued. The State Prosecutor's Office involved itself in the matter 
and then accused Ms. Be Ba of fraud and jailed her pending trial. In the 
meantime, Mr. Van moved into Ms. Be Ba house. After nine months in 
174 Phap Lenh Thu Tue Giai Quyet Cae Vu An Kinh Te [Ordinance on the Procedures for 
Resolving Economic Disputes}, No. 31 UCTN, ch. 4, art 24 and 28 (Mar. 29, 1994). 
175 Bergling quotes an interview subject on the question of bringing commercial disputes to 
the courts, "It could be the end of the company because if you ask the authorities to help you, your 
company will be investigated and they [the agents of the state] might find many errors," See 
BERGLING, supra note 8, at 129. McMillan quotes a respondent when asked whether or not they 
would bring the authorities into a dispute as saying that the local authorities '~ust create problems 
for us rather than supporting us." See McMillan and Woodruff, supra note 53, at 641. 
176 According to the Supreme People's Court in Hanoi, the bankrupt firms were broken 
down as follows: SOE's, 10; Private, 25; Limited Liability Companies, 15 and Other types of firms, 
14. See Duong Phong, Bust Firms Prefer to Just Disappear ... , VIETNAM INVESTMENT REVIEW, 
May 8, 2000 (Vietnam Investment Database CD-ROM, reI. Aug. 2001). 
177 Report at the Eighth Meeting, supra note 29, at 16. 
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jail and two appeals, Ms. Be Ba was fmally released and regained 
possessionofher home.178 
In another similar case, Mr. Nguyen Sy An was sentenced to 18 
years for 'fraud' in a land dispute between a previous owner of the land in 
question and the local People's Committee. In that case, following the 
end of the American war, Mr. An was granted a home by the local 
People's Committee. This home had previously belonged to a Mr. Le Cu 
who had moved away and left the house unoccupied for years. Mr. An 
applied for and was granted a land-use right to the property. After 
residing in the house for 14 years, Mr. An sold the house. At that point 
Mr. Cu reappeared and sued Mr. An for fraudulently selling property that 
didn't belong to him. At the insistence of the State Prosecutor's Office, 
Mr. An was charged with fraud and then sentenced to 18 years in jail, his 
wife to 8 rars. After two years of imprisonment, Mr. An was fmally 
releasedY 
The state prosecutor's role in civil and commercial disputes is at 
times described as a perfunctory review of the files. Nevertheless, the 
state prosecutor is routinely present at court hearings on civil matters, 
taking notes and presenting opinions on the case to judges.18o The active 
presence of the prosecutor during proceedings can create a significant 
level of anxiety amongst parties to a dispute regardless of the content of 
the dispute. 
The structure of the dispute resolution system creates obvious 
incentives for parties to settle their disputes without the intervention of 
the courts. Also, the lack of effective external enforcement mechanism of 
contracts and business agreements leads parties to undertake different 
types of contracting that are based upon trust, relationships, and self-
enforcement of business agreements rather than third party enforcement. 
This structuring of business and dealing patterns has an impact on the 
kind and types of businesses that are possible in the present climate. 
Vietnam's business community has organized itself in ways that are 
familiar of the patterns identified by Landa and Bernstein.!8i 
178 Nguoi Bi Hai Co Duoe Boi Thuong? [Will Those Who Have Been Injured Be 
Compensated?], NaVOI LAO DONG, June 12, 2001, at 1 
179 Id 
180 While the author was visiting the courthouse, the Prosecutor was present in all but one 
civil case. 
181 See Janet Tai Landa, A Theory of Ethnically Homogenous Trading Groups, 10 J LEG. ST. 
349 (1981); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEG. ST. liS, 121 (1992). 
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Both studies by McMillan & Woodruff182 and Berglingl83 as well 
as informal discnssions with businessmen confirmed that there is a very 
low level of confidence in the ability of the formal legal system to 
adequately resolve economic disputes between business partners. The 
results of a survey of private businessmen undertaken by McMillan make 
it clear that few businessmen in Vietnam feel the courts do an adequate 
job. In response to the question, which third parties can help them 
resolve business disputes, 89% of surveyed businessmen responded 
"there is no one." Only 2% of respondents answered that they would take 
a commercial dispute to the courts or other local bodies. 1M 
A typical response to the lack of third party enforcement is that 
businessmen rely on networks and relationships in order to develop trust 
and a binding commitment to contracts. l85 In Vietnam, parties tend to do 
business with parties that are known to them or with parties with which 
there is a trusted intermediary. As a result, much of the economic activity 
undertaken by private businessmen in Vietnam is local, 60% of reported 
sales are made locally and manufacturers often sell half or more of their 
output to a small number of identified buyers. l86 McMillan's survey 
showed a hesitance on the part of Vietnamese businessmen to undertake 
new deals with strangers, even though the stranger offered a 10% lower 
price. I" 
Without the ability to deal at long -distance, there seem to be 
significant obstacles to long-term development prospects. These 
constraints have yet to be tested, but it is still an open question whether a 
commercial environment based entirely on non-judicial remedies to 
disputes can truly thrive as it seeks to move into international markets 
where it has few, if any, contacts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
182 McMillan and Woodruff undertook a survey that formed the basis of a series of 
quantitative studies. See McMillan and Woodruff, supra note 53; John McMillan and Christopher 
Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH L. REv. 2421 (2000); John 
McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, Inteifirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam, 114 
Q. J. EcON. 1285 (1999). 
183 Bergling carried out a series of interviews that made the basis of a qualitative study on 
the status of the legal system in Vietnam. See BERGLThl"G, supra note 8. 
184 McMillan and Woodruff, supra note 53, at 64l. 
18S See BERGLING, supra note 8, atI25-126; McMillan and Woodruff, Private Order Under 
Dysfunctional Public Order, supra note 182, at 2454-55. 
186 McMillan and Woodruff, supra note 53, at 645. 
187 Only 29% percent of respondents said they would switch from a known supplier to an 
unknown supplier if the new supplier offered a discount of 10% on current prices. See McMillan 
and Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, supra note 182, at 2455. 
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The rapid changes occurring in Vietnam's economy put 
significant strains on Vietnam's socialist legal system. Since the 
beginning of economic reform, the legal system has been in constant flux. 
The direction of legislative efforts and changes in the system appears 
constant: increasing transparency, reduction of arbitrariness and increased 
predictability in the legal system. 
While legislative changes are necessary, they are not sufficient. 
Improvements in the implementation of the law, in the courts and the 
administrative system remain critical challenges particularly as Vietnam 
seeks to pursue a policy of openness to the rest of the world. The vertical 
and horizontal management structure that served central planning will 
likely continue to feel the tensions associated with market opening. The 
discretion that served central planning may, in the end, be a drag on the 
potential long-term development of the economy as businesses take their 
form and operate in the shadow of the rules of the market. Where the 
market rules are unclear and guided by local discretion, the culture of 
local business will adopt those attributes. This adopted business culture, 
in the end, may create a drag on the development oflocal business as they 
grow and seek to expand not ouly throughout Vietnam but also into the 
region. 
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